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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON FOREIGN REVERSE MERGERS AND BOND ETF MISPRICING 
Charles William DuVal 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand 
This dissertation examines two topics that have attracted significant attention in 
the financial media, but have received little academic study. 
The first essay examines the characteristics and performance of foreign firms that 
acquire U.S. exchange listings through a reverse merger (RM). Specifically, this study 
focuses on Chinese companies which have accounted for over 40% of all RMs taking 
place on U.S. exchanges. Examination of these firms' characteristics and daily returns 
from 2004-2010 reveals Chinese firms that engage in RMs are private firms not listed in 
China, motivated by the ability to offer equity-based compensation (which has been 
illegal in China), seek quick infusions of capital, grow assets in the U.S. very quickly 
relative to other RMs, and experience significantly better short and long term 
performance (particularly when using private investment in public equity (PIPES)) 
compared to benchmarks that include cross-listed Chinese firms (a modified Halter USX 
CHINA index), the Russell 2000 and reverse mergers that take place between two U.S. 
firms. 
The second essay is a study of the factors that influence Bond ETF 
premiums/discounts and the ETF Authorized Participant's ability and/or inclination to 
arbitrage Bond ETF mispricing. Using daily data for every U.S. Bond ETF from their 
inception dates through 2010, this study examines each Bond ETF's pricing relative to the 
net asset value (NAV) of their underlying securities, evaluating the arbitrage system in 
place to keep the market price close to their NAV and analyzing the factors that drive the 
premium/discount. Results find transaction costs, liquidity, fund flows, momentum, 
market volatility and market sentiment to be statistically significant factors driving 
pricing. However, there are significant unexplained average premiums for all Bond ETF 
fund sectors other than U.S. Treasuries for the period 2002 through 2010. 
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A "reverse merger" (RM), often termed a "reverse takeover", allows a private 
firm to acquire a publicly traded firm to obtain their exchange listing. RMs have 
significantly outnumbered IPOs as a mechanism for going public in the United States 
(U.S.) since 2002. In the period 2008 through 2010, foreign firms entering the U.S. have 
accounted for over 40% of RMs taking place on U.S. exchanges, as compared to 
approximately 9% of all cross listings and 6% of all IPOs during the same period. This is 
the first study focused on the foreign companies that come to the U.S. through a reverse 
merger. In particular, this paper focuses on Chinese RMs, which have attracted 
significant attention in the financial media, and have accounted for over 63% of reverse 
mergers into the U.S. since 2008. This paper analyzes Chinese RMs firms' characteristics 
and relative operating performance for 2 years prior to coming to the U.S. and up to 4 
years after being listed on a U.S. stock exchange from 2004-2010. Results show, on 
average, that Chinese firms that engage in RMs are private firms not listed in China, 
motivated by the ability to offer equity based compensation (which has been illegal in 
China), seek quick infusions of capital, grow assets in the U.S. very quickly relative to 
U.S. RMs, and experience significantly better short and long term performance 
(particularly when using PIPES) when compared to benchmarks that include cross-listed 
Chinese firms (a modified Halter USX CHINA index), the Russell 2000 and U.S. RMs. 
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Since being introduced in the 2002, fixed income (Bond) exchange traded funds 
(ETFs) have become an important asset class, yet they have garnered little academic 
study. To date, there has not been a complete study of the factors that influence Bond 
ETF premiums/discounts or the ETF Authorized Participants ability and/or inclination to 
arbitrage Bond ETF mispricing. Since 2008!s financial breakdown, the financial media 
has highlighted the fact that Bond ETFs are not the safe havens investors may think. 
Arbitrage mechanisms seem to have been failing with many Bond ETFs experiencing 
significant premiums and discounts. Using daily data for every U.S. Bond ETF from their 
inception dates through 2010, this essay examines their pricing relative to the net asset 
value (NAV) of their underlying securities, evaluating the arbitrage system in place to 
keep the market price close to their NAV and analyzing the factors that drive the 
premium/discount. Results find transaction costs, liquidity, fund flows, momentum, 
market volatility and market sentiment to be statistically significant factors driving 
pricing. However, there are significant unexplained average premiums for all Bond ETF 
fund sectors other than U.S. Treasuries for the period 2002 through 2010. These large and 
varied premiums may create significant trading costs for investors. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKING INTO THE U.S.: A STUDY OF FOREIGN REVERSE MERGERS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Reverse mergers (RMs) have significantly outnumbered IPOs as a mechanism for 
going public in the United States since 2002 (Alpert, 2010). In the period January 1, 
2008 through December 31, 2010, foreign firms entering the U.S. have accounted for 
over 40% of RMs taking place on U.S. exchanges (PrivateRaise, 2011). There has been 
surprisingly little academic study of RMs since their dramatic increase in numbers over 
recent years. To my knowledge, there has been no study of the foreign firms that use 
RMs as a mechanism for going public in the U.S.. I believe this topic is worthwhile 
given the rapid increase in popularity of reverse mergers and the growing interest in 
foreign market investment. 
The focus of this paper is on Chinese firms that represent the vast majority of the 
foreign RMs which have taken place in the U.S.. As Figure 2.1 depicts, 442 Chinese 
RMs were consummated during the period of 2004 - 2010, representing over $50 billion 
in combined capitalization (PrivateRaise, 2011). In comparison, Chinese firms 
represented approximately 9% of all cross listings and 6% of all IPOs during the same 
period (Alpert, 2010). 
*** Insert Figure 2.1 about here*** 
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Chinese RMs have recently attracted significant attention in the financial media. 
Barron's articles "Beware this Chinese Import" (Alpert, 2010) and "Mergers that Don't 
Enrich Shareholders" (Barron's, 2010) highlight the poor performance they observe in 
Chinese RMs over the past few years. These articles make the point that although 
American investors are lured to invest in the incredible growth of China's economy, these 
firms, on average, exhibit poor performance when compared to benchmarks that include 
the Russell 2000 and Halter USX CHINA Index. 
This study focuses on the characteristics and performance of these Chinese firms 
that engage in U.S. RMs. This investigation is the first to study the following four aspects 
of foreign RMs into the U.S.. First, I analyze the characteristics and performance of the 
Chinese firms in their home country before and after conducting a RM into the U.S.. 
Second, I track their a) industries, b) exchange listing migrations and status over their 
first two years and c) stock performance for those that obtain private investment in public 
equity (PIPE) financing versus those that do not. Third, I study the Chinese RM firm 
characteristics that drive their performance and influence their survival. Fourth, I 
compare Chinese RMs performance to RMs that take place between two U.S. firms, 
cross-listed Chinese firms (a modified Halter USX CHINA index) and the Russell 2000 
during the same period. 
In addition, this essay investigates three motivations that may explain why the 
percentage of Chinese RMs relative to the total number of RMs is so significant. First, 
my interviews with RM industry experts reveal many Chinese firms seek to move assets 
out of the communist governmental control to the U.S. market. This study examines and 
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compares Chinese RM's asset growth over time to U.S. RMs, which theoretically should 
not exhibit this motivation, to evaluate, if accurate, how this movement of assets affects 
subsequent performance. Second, these RM professionals report the ability to offer 
equity-based compensation, which has been illegal in China, has influenced Chinese 
firms' motivations to expand to the U.S. market through an RM. This essay assesses the 
effects of equity based compensation on performance and shareholders' wealth of 
Chinese RM firms. Third, RM experts report the majority of these Chinese firms are not 
listed in China prior to coming to the U.S.. The Chinese stock markets are considered by 
many to be very inefficient in that the government must approve a company's listing on a 
domestic exchange. Small to mid-size Chinese companies find the acquisition of growth 
capital very difficult and expensive. Therefore, as the literature's study of IPOs and cross-
listed firms suggests, I hypothesize getting a listing on a U.S. exchange through an RM is 
a relatively easy and inexpensive way to gain credibility and potentially quick infusions 
of capital. 
This study finds Chinese firms that come to the U.S. in this 7 year study of 2004-
2010 are, on average, 8.4 years old, primarily private (over 83%), mid-size (median value 
market cap of $384.34 million and assets of $367.38 million) and profitable with a net 
income of 4.43%, an ROA of 1.33% and an ROE of 1.46%. 
Results reveal, when compared to U.S. RMs, Chinese RMs are significantly 
larger, grow assets faster, are less likely to use PIPES, hold more insider stock, have 
more institutional stock interest and enter the U.S. at higher level stock exchanges. This 
Chinese RM sample is also less profitable and exhibits higher failure rates over the first 
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two years. However, despite U.S. RMs having a superior accounting performance, 
Chinese RMs experience significantly higher returns in the short and long run 
(particularly those that use PIPES). In addition, when compared to this study's sample of 
Chinese cross-listed firms and the Russell 2000, Chinese RM's outperformed both 
benchmarks in 2008 and 2009 and Chinese cross-listed firms in 2010. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the reverse 
merger process and the relevant literature. Section 2.3 outlines the theoretical basis for 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 2.4 describes the data sample and provides a financial 
transaction and characteristics summary. Section 2.5 presents the results of the analysis 
and Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 THE REVERSE MERGER PROCESS AND RELATED LITERATURE 
A "reverse merger", often termed a "reverse takeover", allows a private firm to 
acquire a publicly traded firm to obtain their exchange listing. For all practical purposes, 
the RM process is an acquisition where the target firm's management seeks a public 
entity with which to merge and arranges for the public acquirer to make a bid in exchange 
of some combination of cash and/or stock. The new corporate entity files forms with the 
SEC disclosing the particulars of the transaction and in almost all cases the target firm 
replaces the management and the surviving entity changes its stock symbol to reflect the 
new name (Feldmen, 2010). 
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One primary goal of a traditional IPO is to extract cash from the global capital 
market (Pagano, 1998). A RM, in contrast, requires the Chinese company to expend 
capital to execute what is effectively a purchase of the publically listed company. The 
literature identifies many reasons for firms to go public using an RM. First, when 
compared to an IPO which can take years to complete, most RMs are complete within 6 
months (Feldmen, 2010). Second, RMs allow the target company to go public at 
significantly less cost than alternatives, to include traditional and penny stock IPOs 
(Gleason, 2005; Floros, 2009). RMs avoid most investment bank and underwriter fees, 
which can be a substantial savings (Gleason, 2006; Feldmen, 2010). Sjostrom (2008) 
reports RMs typically cost between $100,000 and $400,000 as opposed to an average of 
$9 million for an IPO. Third, the RM process avoids much of the SEC scrutiny compared 
to alternatives (Floros, 2010). Through 2004 very little information about the target firm 
was disclosed at the time of the transaction (e.g. Sjostrom, 2008; Feldmen, 2010). The 
SEC enacted stricter rules on RMs in 2005 (Gleason, 2006; SEC, 2005). Within four 
days of the consummation of the transaction, an 8-K must be filed that include the new 
firms purpose, two years of financial statements, a list of officers, stockholders, and 
directors, as well as their compensation (SEC, 2005). Despite this additional scrutiny, 
Barron's, among others, imply the RM process allows less reputable firms to go public 
(Alpert, 2010). In contrast, Sjostrom (2008) and industry experts argue the new SEC 
regulations with related scrutiny have enhanced the credibility of RMs. 
Despite the increased popularity of reverse mergers, there have been few studies in 
the literature. The following review represents all the RM research found to date. 
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Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins (2005) examine 121 RMs of public companies 
listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ-AMEX between 1987 and 2001. Overall, the firms in 
their sample are large public firms with existing operations. They find that the RM 
participants are poor performers, and only 46% of the companies in their sample survive 
two years. They conclude RMs are a high risk choice for going public, although 
significantly positive announcement returns are often experienced by the acquiring firm. 
Gleason, Jain, and Rosenthal (2006) compare RMs to traditional and self-
underwritten IPOs. They study 119 RM transactions between companies listed on the 
major stock exchanges between 1986 and 2002. They find RMs and self-underwritten 
IPO companies overall are smaller with lower profitability and outperform traditional 
IPO's over the first few months. However, in their longer run analysis of three years, all 
the groups have similar performance track records. 
Adjei, Cyree and Walker (2008) study 286 RMs and 2,860 IPOs from 1990 
through 2002, and find 42% of RMs and 27% of IPOs are delisted within three years of 
going public. They show that 1.4% of RMs do not meet any initial listing requirements 
and exhibit lower profitability and survival rates compared to IPOs. 
Sjostrom (2008) documents the RM process, legal structure and compliance 
requirements. He argues RMs are smaller on average and thus, generally cannot be 
compared to traditional IPOs. 
Carpentier and Suret (2008) find Canadian companies that go public using RMs 
have generally poor performance after going public. Carpentier, Cumming, and Suret 
9 
(2009) compare going public with Canadian RMs and IPOs and find the choice of a 
reputable auditor adds value in issuing IPOs, which have a higher level of disclosure. 
Floras and Shastri (2010) study the decision to go public comparing RMs between 
U.S. based private and public firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges versus penny stock 
IPOs. They argue firms involved with RMs are information asymmetric as very little 
stock is issued to the public. 
Floras and Sapp (2010) study 585 trading shell companies from 2006 - 2008 that 
are trying to consummate a RM agreement with a private company based in the U.S.. 
They find a significant percentage of RMs are consummated with public shell companies 
organized specifically to transact RMs with promising private firms. Their results show 
average successful transactions experience returns of 48.1% over the first 3 months and 
are more profitable than that of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs). 
In summary, previous studies have focused on RMs between companies that are 
already operating and listed on a U.S. or the Canadian stock exchange. To my 
knowledge, no study has focused on foreign companies that conduct reverse mergers in 
the U.S.. 
2.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In addition to the previously listed reasons for private companies to use RMs as a 
mechanism for going public, my interviews with a principle partner in each of the top 
three law practices (as rated by numbers of RM transactions representing Chinese RMs 
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entering the U.S. (PrivateRaise, 2011)) that cater to Chinese RM participants lead me to 
test the following hypotheses. 
First, these RM attorneys concur with my data findings that the vast majority 
(over 83%) of these Chinese RM firms are mid-size private sector companies not listed in 
China prior to coming to the U.S.. They report many principle stock holders of Chinese 
RM companies clearly state they seek to move assets out of the communist governmental 
control to the U.S. market. If this is accurate, the expectation would be Chinese RMs 
would grow assets in the U.S. at a faster pace than other RM firms that do not have this 
motivation. I test this hypothesis by measuring the rate of Chinese RM asset growth 
compared to U.S. RMs, which theoretically should not exhibit this behavior. I also test 
this rate of asset growth's influence, if any, on performance. 
Second, these RM industry experts report the ability to offer equity-based 
compensation, which has been illegal in China for listed firms, influences Chinese firms' 
motivations to expand to the U.S. market through an RM. Magnan and Li (2008) find 
equity based compensation to be a significant predictor of Chinese firms decisions to 
cross-list into the U.S.. I investigate the effects of equity-based compensation on the 
decision to pursue an RM, subsequent performance and shareholders' wealth of Chinese 
RM firms. 
Third, the Chinese stock markets are considered by many to be inefficient in that 
several layers of government must approve a company's listing on a domestic exchange. 
In addition, Chinese entrepreneurs face significant hurdles securing capital. Industry 
experts report bank lending is out of reach for smaller Chinese firms since loan officers 
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favor larger, state-owned enterprises. The Chinese black market can deliver capital to the 
smallest businesses, however often at cost prohibitive annual interest rates of as much as 
200%. Coming to the U.S. with IPOs can involve a three-year application process with 
an uncertain outcome (Ritter, 1987; Adjei et al., 2008). In this environment of few 
outlets to finance expansion, it's not necessarily a surprise that some Chinese 
entrepreneurs view the RM as a viable shortcut to gain credibility and potentially quick 
capital infusions. Therefore, I hypothesize Chinese RM firms will access capital at a 
faster pace than U.S. RMs participants, which may find accessing capital quickly is not as 
important or difficult to do at reasonable interest rates. 
2.4 SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
2.4.1 Data sources 
One significant reason RMs have not been analyzed in detail is because the data 
has not been readily available. Most of these small cap companies trade on pink sheets or 
the Over the Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) and are not identified or tracked by 
popular data sites (e.g. CRSP and COMPUSTAT). I obtain detailed RM data from 
DealFlow Media and their subsidiary PrivateRaise's (DFPR) subscription database. This 
firm has tracked RM participant's characteristics, PIPE related data (if applicable) and 
basic transaction information since January 2004. The total Chinese RM sample 
represents 442 transactions that took place from January 1, 2004 through December 31, 
2010. DFPR has tracked RMs in significantly more detail since 2008, resulting in a 208 
Chinese RM subsample and a 440 U.S. RM sample that is used throughout much of this 
analysis. These samples represent all the Chinese and U.S. RM transactions in the three 
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year period January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2010. DFPR variables include state 
of incorporation, merger and incorporation dates, numbers of authorized and outstanding 
shares, initial and surviving corporate names and stock symbols, industry and sector, 
equity based compensation, shell and PIPE details (if applicable) and closing prices for 
day one and four weeks after the completed transaction date (PrivateRaise, 2011). 
DFPR does not track daily stock transactions or ongoing financial statement data. 
I obtain daily stock transaction data from Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. Financial 
statement information is hand collected from SEC filed 8-K/As, 8-Ks, lOKs, SC-14Fls, 
Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. From these filings I collect key accounting variables for 
these Chinese RM firms for two years before they consummate their RM, and for every 
year thereafter through 2010 or their delisting, whichever occurs first. The accounting 
variables include total assets, revenue, net income, cash and equivalents, debt, operating 
cash flow, beta, numbers of outstanding shares, shareholder stock options and percentage 
of stock held by insiders and institutions. 
Sjostrom (2008), Floros and Shastri (2010) and Floras and Sapp (2010) note that 
RMs should not be compared to traditional IPOs for reasons that include their smaller 
size and information asymmetry. I compare these Chinese RM companies' characteristics 
and performances from January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2010 to three 
benchmarks. First, at the time of this study, the Halter USX CHINA Index is comprised 
of 198 Chinese firms that include 75 Chinese RMs. I use the financial data for the 
remaining 123 cross-listed Chinese firms to create one benchmark for financial 
characteristics and performance comparisons. Second, to analyze any unique Chinese 
motivations for RMs, I also compare their characteristics and performance to the 440 
RMs consummated between two U.S. firms that took place in the same time period, 
January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2010. Third, I compare Chinese RM performance 
to the Russell 2000. 
2.4.2 Sample summary and financial characteristics 
Table 1 breaks down all RMs into the U. S. markets by target country from 
January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2010. Approximately 68% (208 of 304) of the 
foreign RMs (28% of all RMs that take place on U.S. exchanges) involved Chinese 
companies. Table 2.1 also reveals the recent growth of Chinese RMs, which have 
increased by 66% (53 to 88) from 2009 to 2010, whereas the numbers of U.S. RMs has 
decreased by over 4% (157 to 150) during the same period. Figure 2.2 gives a graphical 
depiction of the relative number of RMs consummated by U.S., Chinese, and foreign 
(non-China) firms by quarter from January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2010, and 
reflects the increase in Chinese RMs versus the decline in the number of U.S. RMs since 
2009. 
***Insert Table 2.1 about here*** 
***Insert Figure 2.2 about here*** 
Tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 report summary statistics for Chinese and U.S. 
RMs for the sample period of January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2010. The results 
reveal the following observations. 
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Sjostrom (2008) argues access to PIPE financing (typically supplied by hedge 
funds) is the primary reason firms choose RMs as the vehicle by which to go public, as 
they have no other alternatives for funding. Table 2.2 reports 36.06% (75 of 208) of 
Chinese RMs use PIPEs to fund their RMs compared to 41.82% (184 of 440) of U.S. 
RMs. These percentages of RMs using PIPES are significantly lower than the average of 
67.23% reported by Floros and Shastri (2010) in their earlier U.S. based RM sample. In 
contrast, this current study's results are much higher than the 20% reported in Gleason's 
2005 sample of U.S. RM's that used PIPES between 1987 and 2001. Table 2.2 also 
reveals Chinese RMs raise over 400% more capital (to include PIPEs), on average, at the 
time of the transaction than U.S. RMs ($7.3 million versus $1.8 million). This result 
appears to support the hypothesis that Chinese RM participants appear to seek quick 
infusions of capital. 
***Insert Table 2.2 about here*** 
As reflected in Panel A of Table 2.3, the average market capitalization of Chinese 
RMs ($77.8 million) at closing is over 48% higher than U.S. RMs ($52.3 million). In 
comparison, Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005) find the values of their 1986-2002 
U.S. RM sample to have a mean of $8.4 million (median of $1.76 million). After four 
weeks, on average, the Chinese RMs market capitalization grows by over 25% ($77.6 M 
to $97.2M) versus U.S. RMs growth of 11% ($52.3 M to $58.1 M). Overall, these results 
appear to support the hypothesis that Chinese RMs seek more capital and grow assets at a 
faster pace than U.S. RMs. 
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*** Insert Table 2.3 about here*** 
Short run stock prices gathered from the DFPR data base, as shown in Panel B of 
Table 2.3, indicate Chinese RMs stocks experience higher returns than U.S. RMs in this 
sample period. During the first four weeks of operation, the Chinese RMs average stock 
price increases 12.25% ($2.53 to $2.84) as compared to the U.S. RM price decrease of 
approximately 4% ($2.33 to $2.23). 
Table 2.4's percentage ownership metrics reveal Chinese RMs have higher 
averages than U.S. RMs for both ownership percentages issued in the share exchange 
without PIPES (85.2 % versus 72.3%) and with PIPEs (87% versus 75.7%). Although not 
reported in this table, 18% of Chinese RMs during this period involved shell companies 
as compared to 63% of U.S. RMs. These results indicate Chinese and U.S. RMs release 
significantly more stock to the public as compared to the 3% reported by the Floras and 
Sapp (2010) RM shell company sample. In addition, the data shows 88% of Chinese RMs 
have a form of equity based compensation versus 67% of U.S. RMs. These results appear 
to support the hypothesis that the principles in Chinese RMs are motivated by the use of 
equity based compensation. 
***Insert Table 2.4 about here*** 
Table 2.5 reports Chinese RMs are far more likely to initially take place on the 
higher level stock exchanges than U.S. RMs, as 6.6% (14 of 208) of Chinese firms take 
place on the NYSE or NASDAQ versus only .06% (3 of 440) of the U.S. RMs. As found 
in previous studies (e.g. Gleason et al., 2005) that study RMs, this table reports most 
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Chinese (76.44%) and U.S. RMs (85.23%) take place on the OTTBB exchange. In 
addition, PIPE financing appears to be a key source of funding for the Chinese RMs that 
take place on higher exchanges as opposed to U.S. RMs, that show no use of PIPEs. 
*** Insert Table 2.5 about here*** 
Table 2.6 breaks down the samples by initial industry for the period. When 
compared to U.S. RMs, Chinese RMs are more heavily weighted in basic materials (9% 
to 5.4%) and consumer/retail (29% to 10.9%). U.S. RMs are more concentrated in energy 
(15.7% to 5.8%), financial institutions (3.4% to 1.4%), industrial (21.8% to 15%) and 
media (8.8% to 3.4%). 
***Insert Table 2.6 about here*** 
2.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Next I study how the sample of Chinese RM firms compare to the 123 cross-listed 
firms that comprise the Halter USX CHINA Index with regard to their operating and 
financial characteristics. Table 2.7 reports the summary statistics for the key comparisons 
for those that existed and had data available on December 31, 2009. Like Sjostrom 
(2008), who reports RMs can not be fairly compared to IPOs, results show Chinese RMs 
are significantly different than Chinese cross-listed companies with respect to almost 
every measured metric. Comparing median values, Chinese cross-listed firms have 
almost 8.5 times the market capitalization ($394 million to $46.7 million), 14 times more 
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total assets than Chinese RMs ($365 million to $51.7 million), almost 500% more 
revenue ($284 million to $58 million), over 1100% the operating cash flow and 6.6 times 
the number of employees. Because of these dissimilarities, I support Sjostrom's (2008) 
arguement and concentrate the balance of financial analysis comparing Chinese RMs to 
those RMs that take place between two U.S. firms. 
*** Insert Table 2.7 about here*** 
Following Gleason, Jain, and Rosenthal (2006), I calculate buy and hold returns 
for N firms as: Buy and Hold Return = XiLi W;[ n[i2(l + Kit) - 1] ^  100 
where: wt = average holding period weight for stock i 
Rit= stock i's return on day t 
Tt = delisted date or the end of the holding period, whichever comes first 
Following Floros and Sapp (2010), I use the Fama-French three-factor regression model 
as a benchmark, where the return of a portfolio of reverse mergers is that in excess of the 
one month T-bill return. The BHR abnormal returns are based on an equally weighted 
portfolio. Similar results were obtained with the value weighted portfolio. 
Many of these Chinese RM stocks are initially thinly traded and therefore have 
significant spreads between the bid and ask pricing. Floros and Sapp (2010) find their 
median RM shell companies' spread is close to 45%. I follow the recommendations 
made by Fisher, Weaver and Webb (2009) and Floros and Sapp (2010), and use the 
midpoint of the spread to mitigate the bid ask bounce. 
Using daily returns beginning 30 days prior to the RM, I study the performance of 
the 183 Chinese and 415 U.S. RM participants that actually traded stock before and after 
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they consummate the transaction. I begin by examining the returns beginning 30 days 
prior through 30 days after the RMs consummation. Figure 2.3 reveals more significant 
results than stated earlier with the four week DFPR reported price changes shown in 
Panel A of Table 2.3. The total sample of Chinese RMs (with and without the use of 
PIPES) has an average return of approximately 35%, which is significantly more than the 
12.25% first four week metric DFPR captures after the transaction closes. Although the 
Chinese RM result appears significant, Floras and Sapp (2010) report their RM shell 
sample firms experience a 54% increase in this 60 day window. In addition, as other 
studies have shown (e.g. Gleason et al., 2005; Floras and Sapp, 2010) and the graph 
depicts, the results show evidence of an increase in wealth to the public firm's 
stockholders after the announcement dates, which in this sample are all within five weeks 
before the RM consummation date. Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005) and Floras 
and Sapp (2010) find similar results and suggest insiders are investing more capital and 
running up the price as a successful transaction becomes more evident. The same is true 
of the U.S. RMs, on average, as they experience an overall return of approximately 15% 
during the 60 day period as opposed to the reported DFPR 4% decrease over the first four 
weeks after the transaction takes place. There is also a price correction that appears for 
both U.S. and Chinese RMs within a few day window following the consummation date 
that appears to reflect the market's reaction to the SEC documents required to be filed 
within four days following the transaction. Overall, however, Chinese RMs significantly 
outperform U.S. RMs over the sixty day period. 
***Insert Figure 2.3 about here*** 
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Prior research (e.g. Gleason et al., 2005; Floras and Shastrie, 2009) reports RMs' 
BHRs are different when comparisons are made with those that use PIPES and those 
firms that do not. Table 2.8 separates the Chinese and U.S. RM sample into PIPE/non-
PIPE transactions and presents the short and long run BHRs for various event windows. 
The total sample varies by year for each set as noted in column N in each panel, revealing 
that the majority of transactions do not use PIPES and fewer firms exist over time. The 
Chinese RM's results report performance for the period January 1, 2004 through 
December 31, 2010. The U.S. RM's results reflect performance for the period January 1, 
2008 through December 31, 2010. The longer Chinese RM sample period allows a study 
of some firms over a period of up to four years, whereas data availability limits the study 
of the U.S. RMs to a maximum of 2 years. The stocks are equally valued and the BHRs 
represent the cumulative market change over the relevant event window. Panel A reflects 
results for those firms that do not use PIPES and Panel B reports results for those firms 
that use PIPE financing at the time of the initial transaction. The results are significantly 
different when comparing Chinese RM to U.S. RM returns, with and without the use of 
PIPES. 
Table 2.8, Panel A's first event window (-30, -1) reports the change in price in the 
30 days before the RM transaction. Chinese RM firms, on average, that do not use PIPES 
realize a 9.61% return as opposed to the U.S. RM non-PIPE return of 4.77%. Over time, 
the Chinese non-PIPE RMs never yield a negative return and those that survive yield a 
33.24% average return over their first four years. The U.S. non-PIPE sample, however, 
although positive over time, yields negative returns over the first ninety days and 4.56% 
over the first two years as opposed to the Chinese RM two year return of 22.45%. 
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Table 2.8, Panel B shows all the Chinese PIPE RM event windows to yield higher 
returns than the U.S. PIPE RMs as well as Panel A Chinese non-PIPE RMs. As compared 
to Panel A, Panel B reports the average return for Chinese PIPE RMs is 16.44% as 
compared to 12.68% for U.S. PIPE RMs for the same 30 days prior to the RM 
consummation. The first 90 day window after the RM transaction yields 31.53% for 
Chinese PIPE RMs as compared to the U.S. PIPE RM's 12.41%. Floros and Sapp (2010) 
report RMs that are formed with shell companies using PIPES experience a significantly 
higher yield of 48% in the first 90 days. To make a direct comparison, two year returns 
are, on average, 34.77% for the Chinese PIPE RMs compared to a 9.11% U.S. PIPE RM 
return. These results are significantly higher than the negative 2.1% first two year shell 
RM results reported by Floros and Sapp (2010), but overall, consistent with previous 
studies (e.g. Gleason et al., 2005; Floros and Shastri, 2010) that show RMs using PIPEs 
experience higher returns. Chinese PIPE RMs that survive four years yield a 44.32% 
return as opposed to the 33.24% return for non-PIPE Chinese RMs.. In summary, 
comparing results in Panel A to Panel B with respect to short and long run returns, there 
is a significant improvement for RMs that use PIPES over those that do not. 
In addition, PIPE use appears to influence the number of firms that survive. As 
reported in Table 2.8, Panel A, approximately 49% (104 of 212) of the Chinese RMs that 
do not use PIPES survive 2 years and 17% (36 of 212) four years. Approximately 24% 
(59 of 244) of U.S. non-PIPE RMs survive two years. Over 63% (77 of 122) of Chinese 
PIPE RMs survive two years as compared to 49% non-PIPE Chinese RMs. Over 33% 
(41 of 122) of Chinese PIPE RMs survive four years as compared to the 17% that do not 
use PIPES. U.S. PIPE RMs realize a similar difference with over 36% (65 of 177) PIPE 
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firms surviving two years as opposed to 24% of non-PIPE U.S. RMs. Floros and Shastri 
(2010) find simliar PIPE influence on shell RM survival rates. They report 90.20% of 
shell PIPE RMs survive three years as opposed to 27.5% of firms unable or unwilling to 
receive PIPE financing. 
***Insert Table 2.8 about here*** 
Next, I examine survival numbers by year, the different reasons these 
firms did not survive, as well as their exchange migrations over time. Table 2.9 reports 
the results for the full sample of Chinese and U.S. RM's which varies by year for each 
set, reflecting the fewer firms that exist over time and data availability. 
Table 2.9, Panel A reflects the survival rates for all Chinese RM's that took place 
between January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2010 and the U.S. RM's that took place 
between January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2010. Because of data limitations for 
U.S. RMs, the only direct comparison to Chinese RMs is for the two year period, which 
shows 93.23% of U.S. RMs survive two years as opposed to 66.54% of Chinese RMs. 
Both rates are significantly higher than the Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005) study 
of 1981-2001 major stock exchange RMs, which reports 46% of their sample survived 
two years. Since they were exclusively studying U.S. RMs participants, it would suggest 
RM participants are getting stronger financially. Panel A further reports 72.22% of the 
remaining Chinese RM firms survive the third year, 68.75% the fourth year and 64.47% 
of Chinese RMs survive the fifth year. Overall, 52.6% of the Chinese RMs survive three 
years (143 of 272), as compared to the 42% three year survival rate reported by Adjie, 
Cyree and Walker (2007). This study's higher survival statistics are argued by RM 
22 
experts to be a result of the additional SEC scrutiny RMs have received since 2005, 
however the results show approximately 30 to 35% of the Chinese RMs are going out of 
business per year. 
Table 2.9, Panel B reflects any changes in listing status for both groups during 
their first two years, tracking their exchange migrations back and forth from pink sheets 
and OTC Bulletin Board listings to NASDAQ and/or the NYSE. Floros and Shastri 
(2009) argue the primary goal for an RM is to move to higher level stock exchanges. 
Results show almost 94% of U.S. RMs do not change their listing status over this sample 
period as compared to approximately 61% of Chinese RMs. These results for U.S. RMs 
are significantly different than those found by Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005), 
which report only 66% of their U.S. RM sample had no change in listing exchange over 
the first two years for their study period of 1991 through 2002. Although Chinese RMs 
are more successful moving up in exchanges (11% to U.S. RMs 1%), they are more likely 
to fall back into lower exchanges (over 28% to U.S. RMs 5.23%). Although not reported 
in this table, over a window of five years, 14.27% of Chinese RMs move up in exchanges 
and 33.66% move down. 
With data collected from SEC filings, Table 2.9, Panel C reports the different 
reasons that the RM's in both groups did not survive. Although the Chinese RM results 
reflect data collected for seven years as opposed to the three years for U.S. RMs, the 
percentages are similar, with bankruptcy being the largest explanation (63.1% for 
Chinese RMs and 64.0% for U.S. RMs), followed by acquisition, going private and 
transacting another RM. 
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***Insert Table 2.9 about here*** 
Next, examining the financial characteristic differences for these Chinese and 
U.S. RM firms, Table 2.10 compares the median values for the 208 Chinese and 440 U.S. 
RM's that took place between January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2010. Net profit 
margin is net income divided by sales, % Institute is the total percentage of institutional 
ownership and % Insiders is the total percentage of insider ownership. Overall, results 
show significant differences in these RMs, with Wilcoxon two sample median 
comparison z test statistics all significant at the 1% level, with the exceptions of 
operating cash flow and number of outstanding shares. On average, Chinese RMs are 
68% larger with a market cap of $96.8 million compared to the U.S. median value of 
$57.6 million and have 85% more assets ($88.33 million to $47.99). Chinese RMs are 
more profitable (1.24% to 1.03%), have a higher percentage of institutional ownership 
(7.11% to 4.22%), and higher percentages of stock owned by insiders (85.82% to 76.48). 
This result appears to support the hypothesis that equity compensation is a motivation for 
Chinese RMs, as owners maintain significantly more stock. 
***Insert Table 2.10 about here*** 
No study to date has examined foreign firm characteristics before they came to 
the U.S. using an RM. Reporting median values, Column 1 of Table 2.11 reflects an 
summary of the SEC filing's Chinese firm financial characteristics data for the two year 
period prior to consummating a U.S. RM. Although not reported on the table, the data 
shows 83.4% of these firms are private firms in China before coming to the U.S., with an 
average age of 8.4 years. As Table 2.11 reports, these are midsize firms with a market cap 
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of $384.34 million, total assets of $367.38 million, have a net income of 4.43%, an ROA 
of 1.33% and an ROE of 1.46%. 
***Insert Table 2.11 about here*** 
Table 2.11 also shows results of a study as to how these Chinese and U.S. RM's 
financial characteristics change during their first two years of operation. Using median 
values, columns 2 and 3 compare Chinese and U.S. RMs for the end of year one and 
columns 5 and 6 compare their characteristics at the end of year two. Again, overall 
results show statistically significant differences in these RMs using Wilcoxon median 
comparison z test statistics for most characteristics. Chinese RM's market cap grows over 
52% from the end of year one to the end of year two ($77.63 million to $118.31million) 
compared to a U.S. RM growth rate of 19.44% ($52.3 million to $62.47 million). In the 
second year, Chinese RM assets grow 36.75% as opposed to U.S. RM's 7.98%, a 460% 
increase. Although net income percentages are positive and increase for both Chinese and 
U.S. RMs over the first two years, U.S. RMs are more profitable year one (1.44% to 
Chinese 0.65%) and year two (1.61% to Chinese 1.16%). U.S. RMs also have a 
significantly higher ROA for year one (3.75% to Chinese 0.75%) and year two (4.08% to 
Chinese 3.75%). These results would appear to support the hypothesis that Chinese RM 
firms may be more motivated to move and grow assets at a faster pace than other RMs 
and perhaps less likely to be concerned about the returns for their stockholders. These 
results are significantly different than those reported by other studies. Floras and Sapp 
(2010), argue RMs are, on average, illiquid, unprofitable and have few assets. Carpentier 
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and Suret (2008) report Canadian RMs have very low profitability with little to no 
ongoing improvement and subsequently, a low survival rate. 
Table 2.11 also shows Chinese RMs continue to hold more insider stock 
than U.S. RMs at the end of year one (87.3% to U.S. 78.68%) through year two (83.64% 
to U.S. 74.32%), which also appears to support the hypothesis that equity based 
compensation through insider stock ownership is more prevalent in Chinese RMs. In 
summary, over their first two years, both Chinese and U.S. RMs firms are increasing 
revenue and debt, improving margins, see an increase in institutional stock ownership, 
release more shares to the public and improve profitability as measured by ROA and 
ROE. Interestingly, despite the relative poorer financial performance shown in Table 
2.11, Chinese RMs realize higher returns than the U.S. RMs. 
To determine the Chinese RM firm characteristics that drive performance, Table 
2.12 reports regression results for the impact of firm specific variables on the returns (R i t) 
of Chinese RMs that survive one year. Specifically, the following model is estimated: 
Ru = a + faSIZEu + p2CASH i t  + p3ROA l t  + P*ROE i t  + psIND i t  + (36EQUITY i t  + pbPlPE i t  + e l t  
I use the log of total assets (SIZE) as a proxy for firm size, cash and equivalents (CASH) 
to total assets to control for liquidity constraints and both return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) for profitability. Previous studies have found conflicting results 
with regard to whether returns are influenced by the RM participants being from different 
industries (IND) and the use of PIPE (PIPE) financing. Therefore, I use dummy variables 
for these as well as for equity based compensation (EQUITY) to investigate whether these 
variables influence Chinese RM firms' performance over time. Table 2.12 presents three 
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models, one for each dummy interaction variable. Overall, results indicate larger, more 
liquid firms experience higher returns, as the coefficients for log of total assets (SIZE) 
and CASH are positive and significant at the 1% level. Like Gleason, Rosenthal and 
Wiggins (2005), this study finds participants being from the same industry are not 
statistically significant with respect to long run returns (the results reported are for the 
basic materials industry, which had the highest coefficient (.0001) and statistical 
significance (0.07)). 
***lnsert Table 2.12 about here*** 
Table 2.12 results also reveal firms that offer equity based compensation 
experience statistically significant higher first year returns at the 1% level. This result 
appears to support the hypothesis that equity based compensation plays a role in Chinese 
RMs. In addition, as previous evidence has shown, those firms using PIPES realize a 
positive and significant increase in returns. Overall, the three models have adjusted R-
squares that range from 14.36% to 22.67% and F statistics show all the models are 
significant at the 1% level. 
***Insert Table 2.13 about here*** 
Finally, I compare this study's results to the two highlighted Barron's articles that 
report Chinese RMs, on average, exhibit poor performance as compared to the Russell 
2000 and the Halter USX CHINA Index. Having met with an author of the Barron's 
articles and receiving their sample and a copy of their program that searched for their 
Chinese RM transactions, I question the accuracy of their benchmark and sample. 
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Barron's failed to recognize that 75 of the 198 Chinese firms that comprise the Halter 
USX CHINA index are RMs. In addition, their program that searched for Chinese RMs 
was flawed, as 36% of their sample are not RMs but regular takeovers taking place in the 
U.S.. Table 2.13 reports an accurate comparison of Chinese RM performance to that of 
U.S. RMs, Chinese cross-listed firms (a modified Halter USX CHINA INDEX) and the 
Russell 2000 for the three year period of 2008-2010 (Russell, 2011). Chinese RMs, on 
average, outperform all these benchmarks in every year of this period with the exception 
of the Russell 2000 in 2010 (25.3% to the Chinese RM return of 21.54%). 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although there has been some research of U.S. participants in RMs, this is the 
first study focused on the foreign companies that come to the U.S. through a RM. These 
transactions are important as foreign firms entering the U.S. have accounted for over 40% 
of RMs taking place on U.S. exchanges from 2004 - 2010, as compared to approximately 
9% of all cross listings and 6% of all IPOs during the same period. This study fills this 
research gap as it examines the motivations, financial characteristics, and performance of 
foreign RMs. Focusing on Chinese RMs, which have accounted for over 63% of RMs 
into the U.S. since 2008, this is the first study to analyze foreign RMs firms' 
characteristics prior to coming to the U.S. and up to five years after being listed on a U.S. 
stock exchange. 
Results show, on average, that Chinese firms that engage in RMs are private 
firms not listed in China, are motivated by the ability to offer equity based compensation 
(which has been illegal in China), seek quick infusions of capital and grow assets in the 
U.S. very quickly relative to U.S. RMs (which may indicate a movement of assets out of 
China). In addition, Chinese RMs experience significantly higher short and long term 
performance when compared to benchmarks that include cross-listed Chinese firms that 
comprise the Halter USX CHINA Index, the Russell 2000 and U.S. RMs. 
The evidence also shows Chinese and U.S. RMs that use PIPES experience higher 
returns and survival rates, however U.S. RM's, overall, have a higher rate of survival in 
the first two year period. In summary, although RMs do seem to involve considerable 
risk, both Chinese and U.S. RM's generate positive long-term performance for 
shareholders of the new entity. 
29 
CHAPTER3 
BONDING WITH ETFS: A STUDY OF BOND ETF MISPRICING 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since being introduced in 2002, fixed income (Bond) exchange traded funds 
(ETFs) have become an important asset class, yet they have garnered little academic 
study. This paper investigates the pricing deviations of Bond ETFs from the underlying 
securities' net asset values (NAV). For the ETF model to work, the funds methodologies 
depend on NAVs of individual units correlating closely with the price of the ETF units 
themselves. Since 2008's financial breakdown, Bond ETF mechanisms seem to have been 
failing with many Bond ETFs experiencing significant premiums and discounts. The 
financial media has highlighted the fact that Bond ETFs are not the safe havens investors 
may think (e.g. Salisbury 2010). Some additional evidence published to date includes: 
1) From its launch in April 2007 through October 6, 2009, the Vanguard Total Bond 
Market ETF closing daily price was equal to or above the net asset value 98% of 
the time, and 36% of the time by a significant .5% or more (Laise, 2009). 
2) iShares High Yield Corporate Bond ETF traded at a 12.49% premium at one point 
in April 2009, and traded within .5% of its NAV only five days in the 3rd quarter 
of 2009 (Laise, 2009). 
3) Barclays Capital High Yield Bond Fund market price gained 6% in the 12 months 
ending August 31,2009 although it's NAV lost 1% (Lauricella, 2009). 
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4) In 2009, the Bond ETF shares of Barclays 1-3 year Credit Bond Fund regularly 
traded at premiums of 2% or more, and did not trade within .5% of its NAV on 
any day in the third quarter (Lauricella, 2009). 
"In stock ETFs, if there was a premium at all above .5%, you wouldn't touch it 
with a 10 foot pole", reports Matt Hougam, director of the ETF analysis for 
Indexuniverse.com (Laise, 2010). "While investors can allow Bond ETF's more leeway, 
a premium over 1 % should definitely set off warning signs" argues Rick Ferri, a financial 
advisor and author of "The ETF Book". Ferri reports he stopped using Bond ETF's in 
2008 when he noticed their market prices moving away from the NAV. "But in the more 
volatile markets ... it got a lot worse than I ever would've expected" he says. "I don't see 
the benefit for any investor" (Ferri, 2009). 
However, these premiums have not stopped investors from investing in Bond 
ETF's and the market has catered to the increased demand. As Figure 3.1 reports, the 
number of Bond ETFs has dramatically increased, expanding from only 6 at the end of 
2006 to 118 at the end of 2010. Figure 3.2 plots the dramatic increase in Bond ETF 
capital investment by year from 2002 - 2010. Bond ETF's held $119.6 billion at the end 
of 2010, up 234% from the end of 2008 (Lim, 2011). Over half of the new ETF cash flow 
from early 2009 through 2010 has been in Bond ETFs (Lauricella, 2011). As Figure 3.3 
reflects, all the major sectors (government, investment corporate and junk bonds) have 
experienced more capital investment during 2008-2010 as they did in the previous nine 
years combined. 
***Insert Figure 3.1 about here*** 
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*** Insert Figure 3.2 about here*** 
***lnsert Figure 3.3 about here*** 
This significant infusion of capital investment in Bond ETFs since 2008 is 
primarily due to two reported reasons: 1) fear - as investors pull their money out of the 
stock market and into what they perceive as safer and more reliable income investments 
and 2) greed - a significant portion of new investment is chasing large returns in high 
yield bonds to make up for huge losses in stock since 2008. 
The Law of One Price would suggest that the price of a basket of securities should 
equal the component parts prices. Deviations in ETF fund prices from their fundamental 
NAV's should not be observed in an efficient liquid market with no arbitrage limits. In 
theory, arbitrage is a key principle in financial markets as it is a key mechanism to allow 
efficiency. However, in reality, arbitrage is limited to the extent that there are frictions 
and limitations in the market. These limitations and frictions should be reflected in ETF 
pricing deviations from NAV. 
In addition to the value of the underlying securities, recent studies argue equity 
mutual fund and ETF pricing are affected by a combination of factors that include 
liquidity (e.g. Amihud 1986, 2002; Ackert and Tian 2008), fund flows (e.g. Edelen, 2001; 
Kalaycioglu, 2004), momentum (e.g. Ackert and Tian, 2008), market volatility (e.g. 
Ackert and Tian, 2008), market sentiment (e.g. Lee et al., 1991) and errors in reported 
prices (e.g. Ferri, 2009). 
32 
This study investigates how these and other factors that are unique to fixed 
income markets drive market premiums and discounts and their influences on Bond ETF 
price levels. I analyze these effects from the inception of Bond ETFs in 2002 through 
2010, which includes extremely volatile periods of time during which many individual 
fixed income securities did not trade. As the Bond ETF market continues to expand, it is 
important for investors to understand pricing and trading behavior to help achieve more 
efficient execution. To my knowledge, there has not been a complete study of the factors 
that influence Bond ETF premiums/discounts or the ETF Authorized Participants (APs) 
ability and/or inclination to arbitrage Bond ETF mispricing. 
Results reveal significant (far exceeding the average 5 to 25 basis point premium 
found in equity ETFs) premiums for all Bond ETF sectors other than U.S. Treasuries, 
with aggregate ETF bond funds averaging a 63 basis point premium, a 151 basis point 
average premium in investment grade corporate Bond ETFs and an almost 2 full 
percentage point (199 basis points) average in high yield bond funds. 
This study finds transaction costs, illiquidity, fund flow, momentum, volatility 
and market sentiment all have a statistically significant impact on premium. However, 
significant unexplained average premiums remain. These large and varied premiums may 
create significant trading costs for investors. Secondary market investors should be aware 
of these premiums and when the premiums are large, they should consider not transacting 
business. 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I review the 
literature identifying factors that have been shown to affect mispricing. Section 3.3 
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describes the data and reports summary information. Section 3.4 outlines the research 
method, section 3.5 presents empirical results and section 3.6 provides concluding 
remarks. 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Exchange traded funds have garnered significant academic attention in recent 
years (for a better understanding of ETFs see Gastineau (2001) and "The ETF Book" by 
Ferri (2009)). An emphasis in recent study is whether U.S. ETF equity market prices 
deviate from net asset values. Elton, Gruber and Corner (2002) and Ackert and Tian 
(2000; 2008) analyze mispricing in equity ETF's based on U.S. indices and find 
discrepancies to be minimal, whereas Engle and Sarkar (2002; 2006) and Jares and Lavin 
(2004) find mispricing is prevalent in international equity ETF's. These studies find a 
significant portion of the international stock ETF's deviations are attributed to the 
minimal overlap of trading hours with their underlying markets and using stale 
underlying index values. Engle and Sarkar (2002) find mispricing for domestic stock 
ETF's average a premium of 5 basis points. 
Other academic studies have shown ETF pricing is affected by a combination of 
factors that drive equities as well as factors that are unique to fixed income markets. 
These influences include transaction costs, liquidity, fund flows, momentum, market 
volatility, market sentiment and errors in reported prices. 
Research has shown that liquidity affects pricing. For example, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) and Amihud (2002) provide evidence that security illiquidity drives 
lower asset prices and higher returns. Allen and Gale (1994) find illiquidity has a smaller 
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effect in open economies when compared to emerging markets. Ackert and Tian (2008) 
study country ETF equity funds offered in the U.S. and find a U-shaped relationship 
between fund premium and market liquidity, suggesting lower mispricing with more 
active trading. They also show illiquidity results in larger bid/ask spreads. 
Fund flows have been studied for various asset classes. Warther (1995) and 
Edelen and Warner (2001) find a significantly positive relationship between cash flows 
into mutual funds, security returns and pricing. Edelen and Warner (2001) also find 
significant relationships between flow and the previous day's return, implying flows 
follow returns. Kalaycioglu (2004) studies the flow of funds into five stock ETF's indexes 
and the rate of return of the underlying indexes. Using monthly data, he finds a 
significant negative relationship between equity ETF flows and market pricing. 
Momentum has been proven to have effects on ETF pricing in the literature. For 
example, Ackert and Tian (2008) report momentum (price changes in the NAV over 
time) has a significant statistical, although not economically significant, effect on 
premiums in equity ETF's both domestically and internationally. 
Execution risk levels also affect the possibility of an arbitrage opportunity. Ackert 
and Tian (2008) find periods of high volatility of individual assets affect the magnitude of 
the equity ETF premiums or discounts, resulting in what arbitrageurs may view as being 
too risky for a profitable arbitrage opportunity. 
Given the financial turmoil and resulting uncertainty since 2008, trading 
premiums and discounts may have been influenced by market sentiment, similar to the 
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literature's findings with closed end mutual fund discounts (e.g. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 
1991). 
Tucker and Laipply (2010) offer a theoretical framework for analyzing fixed 
income ETFs, and suggest prices are driven by four factors: the value of the underlying 
securities, the level of ETF supply and demand in the secondary market, the cost of share 
creation through the underlying fixed income markets and the level of the fixed income 
market volatility and liquidity. 
The literature also highlights factors that are magnified and unique to fixed 
income markets which need to be considered. For example, the fund NAV is determined 
using the bid side of the market, whereas the creation of new ETF shares is done on the 
market's offer side for individual securities. In addition, a fund's NAV may be calculated 
using mid or offered prices and the creation costs must be calculated accordingly (Ferri, 
2009). Another factor that influences the difference between reported NAV's and the 
value of fixed income securities is the market's practice in reporting. The market prices 
the ETF at 3:00 PM Eastern Standard Time, the close of the U.S. bond market, however, 
the fixed income ETF itself continues to trade until 4:00 PM Eastern Standard Time. 
Although Bond ETF fund data for this period of time is not yet available, any changes in 
pricing in this one-hour period will affect the apparent premium or discount. Volatile 
periods may have a significant effect during this one hour period. 
No prior study has examined these combined influences on fixed income ETF's. 
The goal of this paper is to attempt to determine the factors that drive the 
premium/discount and evaluate the arbitrage system in place to keep the market price of 
Bond ETFs close to their NAV. 
3.3 SAMPLE AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
I obtained the Bond ETF data from Dr. Rabih Moussawi of the Wharton Research 
Data Services at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. The data set includes 
daily fund returns over time for every fixed income ETF since their inception dates, with 
daily information that includes: CUSIP, return, closing price, closing bid and ask prices, 
mid-price (between bid and ask), spread, total volume, total shares outstanding 
(adjusted), changes in total shares outstanding, percent change in total shares outstanding, 
market, fund name, fund turnover ratio, NAV per share, the percentage difference 
between the last trade price and the NAV at the end of the day (premium or discount), 
and the absolute dollar difference between the last trade price and the closing NAV 
(premium or discount). The Wharton data also includes the monthly holdings for all 
ETF's since their inception, to include the CUSIP, fund name, portfolio identifier, 
inception date, the individual securities percentage of total net assets, number of 
securities shares, market value of the security on the report date, name of the security 
held, ticker symbol by the exchange, bond coupon rate and maturity date. I collect the 
daily VIX volatility index data for the period from the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
and the Baker and Wurgler (2006) monthly sentiment index from Wurgler's website. 
The data set provides information for 118 fixed income ETFs, however as of 
December 31, 2010 only 95 ETFs existed for over one year (see Appendix 1 for the list of 
fixed income ETFs for the year ending December 31, 2010) with sufficient data for 
analysis. As this study focuses on U.S. Bond ETFs, I eliminate the 6 international funds 
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and the single convertible bond fund, resulting in 88 fixed income ETFs that existed for 
one year with complete data. 
This essay studies Bond ETF's since their introduction in 2002 and depending on 
the analysis, is separated into various periods. The first period is 2002 through 2006, as 
there were only 6 Bond ETF funds in existence at the end of 2006. The second period 
used for the majority of the study is January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2010, which 
allows a study of a significantly larger number of Bond ETF funds. The second period 
(2007-2010) is further broken down into two timeframes of study to analyze any 
differences before and after the financial crisis of 2008. Specifically, the first timeframe 
January 1, 2007 through September 14, 2008 analyzes the period before the fall of 
Lehman Brothers, which is generally regarded as the trigger point of the financial crisis. 
The last timeframe of September 15, 2008 through December 31, 2010 allows a study of 
the premiums/discounts after the market's downturn in late 2008 and resurgence since 
March 2009. 
I initially investigate the following four Bond ETFs that have been highlighted in 
the financial articles cited earlier for the entire year of 2009.1 chose 2009 because U.S. 
Vanguard Total Bond Market ETF (symbol BND) and US SPDR Barclays Capital High 
Yield Bond ETF (symbol JNK) did not exist prior to 2009, but did exist for 247 and 248 
days respectfully in 2009: 
1. US iShares iBoxx High Yield Corporate Bond Fund (symbol HYG) 
2. US Vanguard Total Bond Market ETF (symbol BND) 
3. US SPDR Barclays Capital High Yield Bond ETF (symbol JNK) 
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4. US iShares Barclays 1-3 Year Credit Bond Fund (symbol CSJ) 
As shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, several observations and conclusions can be made 
studying the descriptive and summary data for these four Bond ETF funds. Specifically: 
1. These four funds reflect the enormous growth during 2009 in Bond ETF's with a 
low of 44% to a high of 416%. 
2. The mean and median premium percentages, ranging from .6% to 2.2%, are 
much higher than that of equity ETF premiums. Ackert (2008) finds equity ETFs 
average 25 basis points and Engle and Sarkar (2002) find a 5 basis point 
premium, on average. In fact, these mean acquisition premiums are very 
expensive relative to almost any other investment (Bloomberg, 2010). 
3. The premium lows, all but one being negative values, all occurred in the 2009 
January through March's market lows. Not one was negative after April 1st, 2009. 
These negative values occurred when investors fled the market and Bond ETFs 
traded at meaningful discounts. 
4. The maximum premiums, ranging from 2.8% to 12.8%, occurred after April 1st, 
2009, after the market began rebounding. 
*** Insert Table 3.1 about here*** 
***Insert Table 3.2 about here*** 
For fixed income sector analysis, I separate the individual ETF Bond funds into 
groups that include 12 short term (1 to 3 year) Treasuries, 14 midterm Treasuries, 14 
long-term (20 + years) Treasuries, 6 U.S. Treasury inflation protected security (TIPS) 
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funds, 9 aggregate bond funds, 28 investment-grade (to include municipals) and 4 high 
yield funds. Table 3.3 shows the results for an analysis of these Bond ETF fund sectors, 
reporting the average premium compared to the average range of bid/offer spreads 
experienced over the period 2007 through 2010. The results reveal significant (far 
exceeding the average 5 to 25 basis point premium found in equity ETFs) premiums for 
all sectors other than U.S. Treasuries, with aggregate ETF bond funds averaging a 63 
basis point premium, a 151 basis point average premium in investment grade corporate 
Bond ETFs and an almost 2 full percentage point (199 basis points) average in high yield 
bond funds. 
***Insert Table 3.3 about here*** 
3.4. METHODOLOGY 
The objective of this paper is to gain insight in the relationship between premiums 
and discounts in Bond ETF prices and transaction costs, liquidity, fund flows, 
momentum, market volatility and market sentiment. Specifically, the following model is 
estimated: 
Pit = a + ptCOSTit + fi2ILMit + p3FLOWit + faMOMit + psVOLit + faSENTlt + eit 
Following the literature (e.g. Ferri, 2009), the ETF market price discount/premium 
dependent variable is calculated using the following formula: 
Market Price - End of Day NAV / End of Day NAV = Discount or Premium (Pit) 
The NAV is defined as follows: 
NAV = Total underlying value of a fund's securities / Number of shares outstanding 
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In the fixed income markets, the fund NAV is determined using the bid side of the 
underlying market, while the individual bonds are acquired on the offer side. I control for 
this variation's effect on the reported premium/discount for each fund. 
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
1. Transaction (share creation) costs (COST) are considered in the literature to be the 
most significant component of fund premiums. Theoretically, a premium or 
discount could persist as long as it is not large enough for an arbitrage 
opportunity, meaning the transactions costs are larger than the premium or 
discount. The literature has shown transaction costs, due to acquiring all of the 
underlying securities, are the largest component of expense, as represented by 
their bid/ask spreads (e.g. Elton, 2002). In a perfectly balanced market, the 
underlying bid/offer spread would be minimal, however in an unbalanced market, 
the entire bid/offer spread may be priced into the transaction. Captured by the 
weighted average bid/offer spread observed in the underlying shares, the 
expectation would be that higher transaction costs would result in a higher 
premium. Cross sectional regression results that follow combine transaction costs 
individually and collectively (where degrees of freedom allow) with the following 
independent variables. 
2. Liquidity (ILM) is a challenge faced by all bond investors and the literature shows 
less liquid underlying assets equate to larger premiums on average. Most bonds 
don't trade on exchanges, therefore the gap between the offer price and bid price 
is typically much wider than on stocks (Bonds, 2009). The recent significant 
capital infusion to most fixed income ETFs forces the Authorized Participants 
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(APs) to buy at the higher offer price. Kay (2009) reports APs may be pricing the 
ETF shares much higher than the NAV, resulting in a bias toward an even higher 
premium. Ackert and Tian's (2008) results indicate illiquidity is a significant 
driver of premiums in equity ETF's, both domestically and internationally. I 
follow their use of Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure, defined as the square root 
of the daily return divided by daily dollar volume. 
3. Following the theoretical framework of Tucker and Laipply (2010) and empirical 
work of Kalayciouglu (2004), the balance of trading activity in the ETF leads to 
the consideration of the level of supply and demand in the secondary market, 
termed the flow factor (FLOW). Like Kalaycioglu (2004), I calculate the flow 
factor incorporating the number of shares that are outstanding. Specifically, ETF 
flow at time t is determined in the following equation, with sharesout = number of 
shares outstanding: 
sharesoutt - sharesoutt-i 
flowt = 
sharesoutt 
A high flow factor would indicate a high level of net purchases, which would 
represent an environment for share creation. In contrast, a significant negative 
flow factor would indicate a high level of net sales, resulting in potential share 
redemptions. Therefore the nature of the coefficient of the flow factor would be 
expected to depend on the overall market's supply and demand as well as the ease 
in which the shares could be obtained for that fund at that time. 
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4. Ackert and Tian (2008) have shown momentum (MOM) to have statistically 
significant effects on equity ETF pricing. I follow their analysis for fixed income 
ETFs and measure momentum as the natural log of the ratio of the fixed income 
ETF funds closing NAV on day t divided by the closing NAV on day t - 1. As 
found in equity ETFs, the expectation would be for momentum to have a positive 
relationship to premiums. 
5. Periods that exhibit high levels of market volatility {VOL) would make it difficult 
for authorized investors to execute an arbitrage opportunity. This execution risk 
adjustment magnitude would be driven by the overall level of volatility in the 
market and whether the AP is creating or redeeming ETF shares (generally 
negative for redemptions and positive for creations). Therefore I make adjustment 
for the risk associated with these volatile periods, with the expectation that more 
volatile markets would increase the premium as APs are more hesitant to create 
more shares. To be more specific, the NAV represents the weighted average of 
the underlying bond bid side prices but does not represent a simultaneous basket 
execution. In less liquid and transparent markets, the theoretical bid offer for a 
given bond can be highly volatile, and may only apply to a very narrow size of 
execution. Accordingly, broker dealers may encounter difficulties sourcing or 
selling bonds to satisfy creation or redemption for certain size of transactions. In 
highly stressed markets, the execution risk adjustment may be significant, 
allowing for larger than normal premiums or discounts. I use the CBOE volatility 
Index (VIX) as a key measure of market expectations of near term volatility. 
Although it is conveyed for the S&P 500 stock index option prices, the literature 
has shown it to be a predictive barometer of market volatility. 
6. The literature has shown that mutual fund flows can be argued to reflect investor 
sentiment (SENT) (e.g. Black, 1986; Lee, 1991; Warther, 1995). The evidence 
shows during periods of positive sentiment, more investments are made in a 
market with higher returns. Although Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that "bond­
like" stocks are less prone to be affected by market sentiment, they state the most 
difficult securities to value are those most difficult to arbitrage. I use their index 
to test for the effects of market sentiment on fixed income ETF pricing, and 
expect overall, that high market sentiment will increase fund flows and therefore, 
reducing premiums for securities that are more liquid. 
Table 3.4 examines the correlations between premium, the dependent variable, 
and these measures of transaction costs (COST), illiquidity (ILM), flow factor (FLOW), 
momentum (MOM), volatility (VOL) and market sentiment (SENT). In line with 
expectations, Bond ETF's with higher transaction costs, illiquidity, momentum and 
volatility are associated with higher premium. As previous literature reports, the flow 
factor (e.g. Kalayciouglu, 2004; Ackert and Tian, 2008) and market sentiment are 
negatively related to premium. The highest correlation is transaction costs with illiquidity 
at 0.5163. 
***Insert Table 3.4 about here*** 
As a robustness check, I run Granger Causality tests on each independent variable 
with premium (P). Table 3.5's Panels A through F report the most significant results 
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(using one lag). All the independent variables are Granger Causal for premium, but 
premium is not shown to be Granger Causal for these independent variables. 
***Insert Table 3.5 about here*** 
3.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 3.6 begins an analysis of cross sectional regressions for the complete 
sample of Bond ETFs funds. Each panel reports regression results for different study 
periods. Panel A studies the period 2002 through 2006, a time frame where there were a 
maximum of six Bond ETF funds in existence. Panel B focuses on January 1, 2007 -
December 31, 2010, a period of significant increases in fixed income capital investment 
and numbers of Bond ETF funds. Panels C and D break down the Panel B 2007 -2010 
timeframe into two periods: Panel C analyzes the period January 1, 2007 through 
September 14, 2008, a period before the fall of Lehman Brothers; Panel D reports results 
for the period of September 15, 2008 through December 31, 2010, allowing a study 
period with a significantly larger number sample, as well as a study of financial press 
reported periods of high premiums/discounts after the market's downturn in late 2008 and 
the market's resurgence since March 2009. 
Results in Panel A of Table 3.6 reflect the analysis of the six Bond ETF funds that 
existed between 2002 and December 31, 2007. Transaction costs in each cross-sectional 
regression are all significant at the 1% confidence level. When regressed individually 
with transaction costs, illiquidity and volatility are positively related at the 5% confidence 
level, whereas fund flows are negatively correlated at the 5% level. Although negative, 
investor sentiment is not statistically significant in this time period. Adjusted R2 ranges 
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from 14.56% to 19.71%. A collective analysis of the independent variables was not 
possible with an insufficient number of degrees of freedom. 
Panel B of Table 3.6 analyzes the entire population of Bond ETF funds for the 
period 2007 through 2010. Again, transaction costs are significant in all regressions at the 
1% confidence level, although the coefficients sizes are not as large when compared to 
the 2002 -2007 timeframe. This result would appear to indicate transaction costs are 
declining over time. Illiquidity, momentum, and volatility (again individually regressed 
with transaction costs in models 1 through 5) are all positively associated with premium 
at the 1% level. Sentiment is again negatively related, but its statistical significance has 
increased to 5%, (although with perhaps a economically insignificant coefficient (-
0.0010)). Fund flow also remains negatively correlated, but now, perhaps due to the more 
recent increase in Bond ETF investment, statistically significant at 1%. Model 6's 
combined independent variable's cross-sectional regression has an adjusted R2 of 17.12%, 
although momentum's statistical significance has reduced from 1% to 5%. Overall, as 
reflected by their higher coefficients as compared to Panel A's 2002 through 2007 period 
of study, the 2007 - 2010 timeframe shows illiquidity, fund flows, momentum, volatility 
and market sentiment to all have a more significant influence on premium. 
Table 3.6's Panel C studies the period January 1, 2007 through September 14, 
2008 to begin a comparison of the independent variables effects on premium before and 
after the fall of Lehman Brothers, generally regarded as the beginning of the financial 
crisis. Overall, the statistical significance of the independent variables are the same as 
those reported in Panel B's 2007 - 2010 results, with the exceptions of momentum, whose 
statistical significance drops from 5% to 10%. Overall, results show the coefficients for 
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transaction costs and volatility are smaller, appearing to reflect a less volatile period of 
study. Model 6's combined independent variable's cross-sectional regression has a higher 
adjusted R2 of 19.78% (as compared to Panel B's 17.12%). 
Panel D of Table 3.6 examines the September 15, 2008 through December 31, 
2010 timeframe. Comparing results to Panel C's previous period of January 1, 2007 
through September 14, 2008, the statistical significance of the independent variables are 
the same with the exceptions of momentum, whose statistical significance increase to 
10% from 5% and market sentiment which decreases from 10% to 5%. When compared 
to the earlier time period, Model 6's combined independent variable's cross-sectional 
regression has a lower adjusted R of 18.34% (as compared to the previous period's 
19.78%). However, the later more volatile time period results in higher independent 
variables coefficients. When comparing models 1 through 6 regressions results for the two 
periods, all the independent variables have larger effects on premium post September 14, 
2008. This result supports the literature and this study's expectation that transaction costs, 
illiquidity, fund flows, momentum, volatility and market sentiment have a more 
significant impact on mispricing during periods of more fund flows, illiquidity and 
market volatility. 
***Insert Table 3.6 about here*** 
Tables 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 report 2007 - 2010 cross-sectional regression analysis 
results for the U.S. Treasury, aggregate, and corporate Bond ETF fund sectors 
respectfully. The high yield Bond ETF sector only had four funds in late 2010 which 
precludes a complete analysis. 
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Table 3.7 reports the cross sectional regression results for the Bond ETF U.S. 
Treasury fund sector from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2010 to include 12 
short term (1 to 3 year), 14 midterm, 14 long term (20+ years) and 6 Treasury inflation 
protected (TIPS) security funds. Although all independent variables have the expected 
signs, results show transaction costs are the only statistically significant variable, which is 
at a 1% confidence level. Combined independent variable results in model 6 report an 
t ' j  
adjusted R of 15.56%. These results appear to reflect the minimal spreads and average 
premiums/discounts reported in Table 3, and that U.S. Treasury securities, in general, 
experience less volatility and are very liquid. 
***Insert Table 3.7 about here*** 
Table 3.8 reports estimates of the cross sectional regressions for the 9 aggregate 
Bond ETF fund sector from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2010. Once again, all 
independent variables have the expected signs and transaction cost has the largest 
statistically significant coefficient (at 1% for each regression). When regressed with 
transaction costs, the three independent variables illiquidity, momentum, and volatility 
are all statistically significant at the 1% confidence level, with fund flow and market 
sentiment at 10%. Adjusted R2 ranges from 17.73% to 19.54%. A collective analysis of 
the independent variables was not possible with an insufficient number of degrees of 
freedom. 
***Insert Table 3.8. about here*** 
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Table 3.9 reports results of the cross sectional regressions for the 28 investment 
grade corporate (to include municipals) Bond ETF fund sector from January 1, 2007 
through December 31, 2010. All independent variables have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. When regressed with transaction costs and collectively, the 
variables illiquidity and momentum are statistically significant at the 1% confidence 
level, with fund flow, volatility and market sentiment at 5%. Combined independent 
variable results in column 6 report an adjusted R2 of 16.77%. Overall, when compared to 
the aggregate bond sector (Table 3.8) which would include U.S Treasuries and in line 
with previous results and expectations, this sector experiences higher transactions costs 
and illiquidity, fund flows, momentum and volatility have more impact on premium. 
***Insert Table 3.9 about here*** 
Overall, cross-sectional regression results in Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9, which focus 
on individual sectors, have more explanatory power than the combined results reported 
earlier in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. As the literature suggests, all this studies cross-sectional 
regression results show transaction costs to have the most significant impact on premium. 
Although to a lesser degree, illiquidity, fund flow, momentum, volatility and market 
sentiment also play a significant role in driving premiums in Bond ETF funds. There 
remain, however, significant unexplained average premiums, as the highest adjusted R2 in 
these regressions is 19.63%. 
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3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Since the market collapse of 2008, Bond ETF's have quickly become popular with 
investors as fear has driven them to safer and more reliable income investments and greed 
has them seeking large returns in high yield bonds to make up for huge losses in stock. 
Over the period of 2007 - 2010 results reveal significant (far exceeding the 
average 5 to 25 basis point premium found in equity ETFs) premiums for all Bond ETF 
sectors other than U.S. Treasuries, with aggregate ETF bond funds averaging a 63 basis 
point premium, a 151 basis point average premium in investment grade corporate Bond 
ETFs and an almost 2 full percentage point (199 basis points) average in high yield bond 
funds. 
This study finds transaction costs, illiquidity, fund flow, momentum , volatility 
and market sentiment all have a statistically significant impact on premium, with larger 
impacts since September 14, 2008. However, large unexplained average premiums 
remain. These large and varied premiums may create significant trading costs for 
investors. Secondary market investors should be aware of these premiums and when the 
premiums are large, they should consider not transacting business. 
The worst problems for Bond ETF's may be yet to come. If investors exit quickly 
from investment grade and high yield corporate Bond ETFs, massive selling could turn 
high ETF premiums into discounts and have an even more significantly negative effect 




This dissertation examines the characteristics and relative performance of foreign 
reverse mergers (RMs) that occur on U.S stock exchanges as well as the arbitrage system 
in place for Bond ETFs. It contributes to the literature in multiple ways. 
The first essay is the only study to date that focuses on the foreign firms that use 
RMs as a mechanism for going public in the U.S.. This topic is worthwhile given the 
rapid increase in popularity of RMs and the growing interest in foreign market 
investment. Specifically, the study focuses on Chinese RMs, which have accounted for 
over 63% of RMs into the U.S. since 2008 and have attracted significant attention in the 
financial media. This is the first research that analyzes foreign firms' characteristics and 
operating performance prior to coming the U.S. and after being listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange. Results indicate Chinese firms that engage in RMs are, on average, private 
firms not listed in China, motivated by the ability to offer equity based compensation 
(which has been illegal in China), seek quick infusions of capital, grow assets in the U.S. 
very quickly relative to U.S. RMs (which may indicate a motivation to move assets out of 
China), and experience significantly better short and long term performance (particularly 
when using PIPES) when compared to benchmarks that include cross-listed Chinese 
firms (a modified Halter USX CHINA index), the Russell 2000 and U.S. RMs. The 
evidence also shows Chinese and U.S. RMs that use PIPES experience higher returns and 
survival rates, however U.S. RM's, overall, have a higher rate of survival in the first two 
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year period. In summary, although RMs appear to involve considerable risk, both 
Chinese and U.S. RM's generate positive long-term performance for shareholders of the 
new entity. 
Using the entire U.S Bond ETF sample since they were introduced in 2002, the 
second essay is the first to study the factors that influence Bond ETF premiums/discounts 
and the ETF Authorized Participants (APs) ability and/or inclination to arbitrage Bond 
ETF mispricing. As the fixed income ETF market continues to expand, it is important for 
investors to understand pricing and trading behavior to help achieve more efficient 
execution. Results reveal Bond ETF premiums, on average, significantly exceed those 
found in equity ETFs premiums for all Bond ETF sectors other than U.S. Treasuries, with 
aggregate ETF bond funds averaging a 63 basis point premium, a 151 basis point average 
premium in investment grade corporate Bond ETFs and an almost 2 full percentage point 
(199 basis points) average in high yield bond funds. This study finds transaction costs, 
illiquidity, fund flow, momentum, volatility and market sentiment all have a statistically 
and economically significant impact on premium, particularly since the financial crisis of 
2008. However, significant unexplained average premiums remain. These large and 
varied premiums may create significant trading costs for investors. Secondary market 
investors should be aware of these premiums and when the premiums are large, they 
should consider not transacting business. 
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Table 2.1. All Reverse Mergers in the U. S. markets by target country 
2008 - 2010 
This table reports the number of reverse mergers by quarter that took place 
in the exchange markets of the United States from January 1, 2008 through 
December 31, 2010 compiled from PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s data base. The 
column United States reports the number of reverse mergers that took place 
between two U.S. participants. The China column reports the number of 
reverse mergers where a Chinese company was the target company. 
Foreign (non-China) transactions are those where a non-Chinese foreign 
firm was the target company. 
Year/Quarter United States China 
Foreign 
(non-China) Totals 
2008-Q1 38 14 8 60 
2008-Q2 36 16 6 58 
2008-Q3 31 19 6 56 
2008-Q4 28 18 4 50 
2008 Total 133 67 24 224 
2009-Q1 27 11 5 43 
2009-Q2 30 10 7 47 
2009-Q3 36 11 10 57 
2009-Q4 64 21 14 99 
2009 Total 157 53 36 246 
2010-Q1 48 25 7 80 
2010-Q2 39 26 17 82 
2010-Q3 38 20 3 61 
2010-Q4 25 17 9 51 
2010 Total 150 88 36 274 
Totals 440 208 96 744 
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Table 2.2. Chinese and U.S. reverse mergers summary 
statistics 2008- 2010 
This table reports the summary statistics comparing Chinese 
RMs to U.S. RMs with and without PIPES for the period 
January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2010 compiled from 
PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s data base. Chinese RMs are those 
conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by a U.S. 
firm and U.S. RMs are those conducted between two U.S. 
companies. PIPES are Private Investment in Public Equity. 
China U.S. 
Total Number of Reverse 
Merger Transactions: 208 440 
Total Number of Reverse 





Total Dollars Raised in Reverse 
Merger + PIPE Transactions: 
Average Dollars Raised in 
Reverse Merger + PIPE 
Transactions: 
$7.3 M $1.8 M 
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Table 2.3. Post-merger valuation summary statistics for Chinese and U.S. RMs 
2008-2010 
This table compares Chinese RM post-merger valuation summary statistics to U.S. RMs for the 
period January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2010 complied from PrivateRaise/D. F. M.s data base. 
Panel A compares the lowest, average and highest post-merger market capitalization valuations 
at the transaction's closing to the same values 4 weeks later. Panel B compares the lowest, 
average and highest post-merger stock prices at the transaction's closing to the same values 4 
weeks later. Chinese RMs are those conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by a 
U.S. firm and U.S. RMs are those conducted between two U.S. companies. 
Panel A. Post-merger China and U.S. market capitalization comparisons 
China Market Cap U.S. Market Cap 
Post-Merger 
Valuation Metrics Low Average High Low Average High 
At Reverse Merger 
Closing(millions) $0.1 $77.6 $697.2 $0.3 $52.3 $629.1 
4-wk Post-Closing 
Stock Price(millions) $0.1 $97.2 $971.0 $0.2 $58.1 $685.7 
4-wk Post-Closing 
VWAP(millions) $0.1 $90.2 $673.1 $0.2 $55.6 $687.1 
Panel B. Post-merger China and U.S. stock price comparisons 
China Stock Price U.S. Stock Price 
Post-Merger 
Valuation Metrics Low Average High Low Average High 
At Reverse Merger 
Closing 0.01 2.53 33 0 2.33 16 
4-wk Post-Closing 
Stock Price 0.01 2.84 24 0 2.23 15.31 
4-wk Post-Closing 
VWAP 0.01 2.7 25.07 0 2.15 12.82 
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Table 2.4. Percentage ownership summary statistics for Chinese and U.S. RMs 
2008-2010 
This table compares Chinese RM percentage ownership summary statistics to U.S. RMs for 
the period January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2010 complied from PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s data 
base. The lowest, average and highest ownership percentages are reported at the transaction's 
closing for reverse mergers with and without the use of PIPES. Chinese RMs are those 
conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by a U.S. firm and U.S. RMs are those 





Low Average High Low Average High 
Percentage 
Issued in Share 
Exchange 
0.00 85.20 100.00 1.30 72.30 100.00 
Percentage 
Issued PIPE 0.10 33.10 517.40 0.10 35.70 2757.10 
Percentage 
Issued in Share 
Exchange + 
PIPE 
14.60 87.00 100.00 1.60 75.70 100.00 
59 
Table 2.5. Initial exchange listing summary statistics for Chinese and U.S. RMs 
2008 - 2010 
This table reports the number of Chinese and U.S. reverse mergers that take place on each 
U.S. exchanges at the time of the initial transaction, with and without the use of PIPES, for 
the period January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2010. The row designated Never Trade reports 
the number of transactions that are consummated but do not succeed in trading at any 
exchange. The data is compiled from PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s data base. Chinese RMs are 
those conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by a U.S. firm and U.S. RMs 
are those conducted between two U.S. companies. PIPES are Private Investment in 
Public Equity. 
China U.S. 













NASDAQ-GS 0 0 0.0 M 0 0 0.0 M 
NASDAQ-GM 6 6 9.2 M 1 0 0.0 M 
NASDAQ-CM 7 5 79.1 M 1 0 0.0 M 
NYSE 1 1 11.8 M 1 0 0.0 M 
OTCBB 159 48 351.8 M 375 169 317.3 M 
OTC 9 0 0.0 M 37 6 11.2 M 
Never Trade 25 15 92.5 M 25 9 5.8 M 
Totals 208 75 544.4 M 440 184 334.2 M 
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Table 2.6. Initial industry distribution for Chinese and U.S. RMs 
with and without PIPE financing 2008 - 2010 
This table reports the number of Chinese and U.S. reverse mergers that take place by 
industry at the time of the initial transaction, with and without the use of PIPES, for the 
period January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2010. The row designated Unknown reports the 
number of transactions that did not report their industry in SEC filings. The data is 
compiled from PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s data base and SEC filings. Chinese RMs are those 
conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by a U.S. firm and U.S. RMs are 
those conducted between two U.S. companies. PIPES are Private Investment in Public 
Equity. 
China U.S. 













Basic Materials 19 12 120.3 M 24 13 7.9 M 
Consumer/Retail 61 29 153.5 M 48 17 25.2 M 
Energy 12 6 55.1 M 69 30 62.6 M 
Financial 
Institutions 3 0 0.0 M 15 4 0.9 M 
Healthcare 30 5 56.1 M 56 20 63.8 M 
Industrial 31 6 67.8 M 96 54 52.3 M 
Media 7 1 5.4 M 39 9 25.4 M 
Real Estate 4 1 11.1 M 5 1 0.5 M 
Technology 34 12 36.5 M 74 31 72.2 M 
Telecommunications 3 2 21.9 M 15 4 10.5 M 
Unknown 4 2 20.3 M 1 1 13.0 M 
Totals 208 75 547.9 M 440 184 334.2 M 
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Table 2.7. Summary statistics for Chinese cross-listed and Chinese RM companies 
This table reports summaiy statistics for the Chinese reverse merger and the Chinese cross-listed firms that comprised the China Halter Index 
on December 31, 2009. The data was hand collected from SEC filings. The number of observations varies based on data availability. 
TOTAL ASSETS TOTAL DEBT TOTALCASH SHARES OUTSTANDING REVENUE (millions) 
Cross Listed Rev Merger Cross Listed Rev Merger Cross Listed Rev Merger Cross Listed Rev Merger Cross Listed Rev Merger 
Mean 8.28 Billion 86.45 million 13.8 Billion 22.27 mill 980 mill 27.18 mill 145.21 37.14 701.00 93.85 
Median 365,000,000 51,705,500 20,540,000 4,410,000 1.51E+08 7.17E+06 50.12 27.61 284.00 58.05 
Maximum 2.12E+11 7.74E+08 3.41E+10 4.73E+08 4.76E+10 2.38E+03 4010.00 190.77 2620.00 875.92 
Minimum 20023000 1.00E+03 0 0 3,990,000 2,380 8.03 3.27 6.10 -157.40 
Std. Dev. 3.10E+10 1.17E+08 5.03E+09 5.36E+07 4.66E+09 8.38E+07 434.0837 31.48386 31800000 133.02 
Observations 123 186 123 186 123 186 123 186 123 186 
OPERATING CASH FLOW MARKET CAP % INSTITUTIONAL STOCK % INSIDER STOCK DEBT/EQUITY RATIO 
Cross Listed Rev Merger Cross Listed Rev Merger Cross Listed Rev Merger Cross Listed Rev Merger Cross Listed Rev Merger 
Mean 2.5 billion 7.7 million 8,320 96.24 22.60 12.37 26.80 46.00 56.87 69.66 
Median 25870000 2320000 394 46.69 13.30 8.85 18.47 44.47 25.07 22.65 
Maximum 4.70E+10 4.22E+08 23,600 836.58 96.50 52.80 95.09 95.87 705.78 2299.61 
Minimum -3.54E+08 -2.81E+08 62.18 3.50 0.20 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.05 
Std. Dev. 8.30E+09 4.35E+07 3.25E+10 127.76 22.28 12.63 25.91 21.55 99.33 213.29 
Observations 123 186 123 186 73 82 71 93 123 186 
# EMPLOYEES BETA AVERAGE VOLUME 
Cross Listed Rev Merger Cross Listed Rev Merger Cross Listed Rev Merger 
Mean 20,378 733 1.55 1.86 762,913 139,082 
Median 2,420 364 1.36 1.40 272,559 25,100 
Maximum 539,168 7,105 4.28 16.12 10,899,900 987,694 
Minimum 120 3 -0.16 -5.02 5,756 8 
Std. Dev. 71153.84 1146.4 0.84 0.95 1567919 227831 
Observations 116 170 103 136 123 186 
Table 2.8. Chinese and U.S. reverse merger performance comparison 
of transactions with and without PIPE financing 
This table reports the mean buy and hold abnormal returns (BHRs) for various 
event windows for the entire sample of Chinese and U.S. RM's. The total 
sample varies by year for each set as noted in column N. The Chinese RM's 
results reflect performance for the period January 1, 2004 through December 
31, 2010. The U.S. RM's results reflect performance for the period January 1, 
2008 through December 31, 2010. The stocks are equally valued and the 
BHRs represent the cumulative market change over the relevant event 
window. Panel A reflects results for those firms that do not issue PIPES and 
panel B depicts results for those firms that use PIPES. The data was compiled 
from PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s database as well as SEC filed 8-K/As, 8-Ks, 
lOKs, SC-14Fls, Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. Chinese RMs are those 
conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by a U.S. firm and U.S. 
RMs are those conducted between two U.S. companies. PIPES are Private 
Investment in Public Equity. DNA -Data Not Available. ***, **, * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Reverse mergers performance without PIPE financing 
China • U.S. 
Event 
Window N BHR /-statistic N BHR /-statistic 
[-30,-1] 212 9.61 2.66*** 244 4.77 444*** 
[0, + l ]  212 14.66 3.24*** 244 1.96 2.07** 
[0,+3] 212 15.39 3.32*** 244 2.34 2.43** 
[0, +7] 212 16.44 3.65*** 244 1.45 2.08** 
[0, +14] 212 14.56 3.46*** 244 -2.54 2.02** 
[0, +30] 212 12.22 4.31*** 244 -3.78 2.12** 
[-30,+60] 212 21.22 4.67*** 244 1.54 2.07** 
[0, +90] 212 11.78 4.43*** 244 -2.76 2.09** 
[0, +180] 193 15.33 3 91*** 233 2.37 2.18** 
[0,+lyr] 138 18.94 3.05*** 146 3.24 2.74*** 
[0, +2 yr] 104 22.45 3.64*** 59 4.56 2.64*** 
[0, +3 yr] 76 23.86 3.02*** DNA DNA DNA 
[0,+4yr] 36 33.24 2.38** DNA DNA DNA 
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Panel B. Reverse mergers with PIPE financing 
China U.S. 
Event 
Window N BUR /-statistic N BUR /-statistic 
[-30,-1] 122 16.44 2.84*** 177 12.68 3.15*** 
[0,+l] 122 22.20 3.26*** 177 11.84 2.87*** 
[0,+3] 122 30.45 3.77*** 177 13.81 2.93*** 
[0,+7] 122 33.26 3.86*** 177 14.79 3.12*** 
[0, +14] 122 29.63 3.53*** 177 15.92 3.21*** 
[0, +30] 122 27.65 3.28*** 177 14.62 3.33*** 
[-30,+60] 122 45.43 4 14*** 177 26.56 3.42*** 
[0, +90] 122 31.53 3.87*** 177 12.41 3.77*** 
[0, +180] 119 38.89 2.94*** 172 10.58 2.83*** 
[0, +1 yr] 98 33.51 3.13*** 126 9.59 2.71*** 
[0, +2 yr] 77 34.77 2.62*** 65 9.11 2.54** 
[0, +3 yr] 67 37.42 2.11** DNA DNA DNA 
[0, +4 yr] 41 44.32 2.22** DNA DNA DNA 
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Table 2.9. Survival and listing migration summary statistics for 
Chinese and U.S. reverse mergers 
This table reports the survival rates and listing status changes for the full sample of 
Chinese and U.S. RM's. The total sample varies by year for each set. Panel A reflects 
the survival rates for all Chinese RM's that took place between January 1, 2004 through 
December 31, 2010 and the U.S. RM's that took place between January 1, 2008 and 
December 31, 2010. Panel B reflects any changes in listing status for both groups 
during their first two years. Panel C reflects the different reasons that the RM's in both 
groups did not survive. The data was compiled from PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s database 
as well as SEC filed 8-K/As, 8-Ks, lOKs, SC-14Fls, Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. 
Chinese RMs are those conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by a U.S. 
firm and U.S. RMs are those conducted between two U.S. companies. 
China U.S. 
Panel A. Survival 
2 years post RM 
3 years post RM 
4 years post RM 
5 years post RM 
181 of 272 (66.54%) 
143 of 198 (72.22%) 
77 of 112(68.75%) 
49 of 76 (64.47%) 




Panel B. Two Year Listing Status 











Panel C. Non-surviving RMs 


















Table 2.10. Statistical summary and comparison of Chinese and U.S. 
financial characteristics 2008-2010 
This table reports the median values for various financial characteristics of 208 
Chinese and 440 U.S. RM's that took place between January 1, 2008 and December 
31, 2010. Net profit margin is net income divided by sales. # of out shares is the 
number of outstanding shares. % Institute is the total percentage of institutional 
ownership. % Insiders is the total percentage of insider ownership. ($M) represents 
millions. The data was compiled from PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s database as well as 
SEC filed 8-K/As, 8-Ks, lOKs, SC-14Fls, Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. Chinese 
RMs are those conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by a U.S. firm and 




Chinese U.S. Ip value] 
Market Cap ($M) 96.8 57.6 4.18 [0.00] 
Cash and equivalents ($M) 6.43 3.56 5.34 [0.02] 
Total Assets ($M) 88.33 47.99 5.16 [0.00] 
Debt/Equity Ratio 23.65 19.54 2.13 [0.04] 
Revenue ($M) 63.02 47.92 3.57 [0.03] 
Operating Cash Flow ($M) 2.32 2.04 0.74 [0.12] 
Net Profit Margin % 1.24 1.03 0.54 [0.04] 
Number of out shares ($M) 32.62 27.43 1.78 [0.30] 
% Institute 7.11 4.22 4.63 [0.04] 
% Insiders 85.82 36.48 1.65 [0.031 
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Table 2.11. Financial characteristics of Chinese firms before consummating a 
reverse merger and a two year post-mergerfinancial characteristic 
statistical summary comparison of Chinese and U.S. RMs 
This table's first column reports the median values (in millions except for percentage 
measurements) for various financial characteristics of Chinese firms for the two years before 
they consummated an RM in the U.S.. Columns two, three, five and six compare the median 
values for the financial characteristics of the first and second years of both Chinese and U.S. 
RM's that took place between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2010. Net profit margin is net 
income divided by sales. # of out shares is the number of outstanding shares. % Institute is the 
total percentage of institutional ownership. % Insiders is the total percentage of insider 
ownership. ($M) represents millions. The data was compiled from PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s 
database as well as SEC filed 8-K/As, 8-Ks, lOKs, SC-14Fls, Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. 
Chinese RMs are those conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by a U.S. firm and 
U.S. RMs are those conducted between two U.S. companies, p values are reported in brackets. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Wilcoxon Wilcoxon 
Chinese median median 
z-test z-test 
Firms China U.S. Statistic China U.S. Statistic 
2 yr Year Year Year 
prior Year 1 1 [p value] 2 2 [p value] 
Market Cap ($M) 384.34 77.63 52.3 2.18 [0.02] 118.31 62.47 1.96 [0.00] 
Cash/equivalents ($M) 26.52 4.31 3.1 0.47 [0.05] 5.42 3.4 1.58 [0.05] 
Total Assets($M) 367.38 87.66 49.72 1.98 [0.04] 124.41 53.69 2.03 [0.00] 
Debt/Equity Ratio 32.37 53.27 47.65 0.56 [0.06] 56.43 49.57 0.77 [0.05] 
Revenue ($M) 331.92 59.43 58.45 0.32 [0.09] 66.89 62.33 0.64 [0.08] 
Op Cash Flow($M) 9.56 2.45 2.64 0.39 [0.05] 3.28 2.77 0.47 [0.06] 
Net Profit Margin % 4.43 0.653 1.44 1.65 [0.03] 1.16 1.61 0.73 [0.04] 
# of out shares n/a 22.77 21.76 0.25 [0.34] 27.65 22.48 0.82 [0.56] 
% Institute n/a 5.56 1.3 2.34 [0.02] 7.34 1.6 2.24 [0.01] 
% Insiders n/a 87.3 78.68 0.94 [0.05] 83.64 74.32 0.28 [0.07] 
ROA% 1.33 0.75 3.75 2.64 [0.01] 0.83 4.08 3.25 [0.00] 
ROE% 1.46 0.81 3.83 2.51 [0.001 1.08 4.26 3.63 [0.00] 
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Table 2.12. Impact of Chinese reverse merger characteristics 
on firm performance 
This table reports the regression results for the impact of various factors on the 
performance (Rit) of the 236 Chinese reverse mergers that survive one year during the 
sample period of January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2010. The following model is 
estimated: 
Rit = a + pxSlZEit + p2CASHit + p2ROAit + P<ROEit + pslNDit + (36EQUlTYit 
+ P6PI PEit +eit 
The independent variables are defined as follows: SIZE is the log of total assets. CASH 
is cash and equivalents used to control for liquidity constraints. Return on equity (ROE) 
and return on assets (ROA) control for profitability. Models 1,2 and 3 report the 
significance of each of the three dummy variables which are equal to 1 if the RM 
participants are in the same industry (IND) (these results are for the basic materials 
industry, which had the highest coefficient), participate in PIPE financing (PIPE) 
or have some form of equity based compensation (EQUITY). Values are 0 
otherwise, t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 









































Table 2.13. A comparison of Chinese reverse merger performance to 
benchmarks 2008 -2010 
This table reports the average calendar year returns for the cross-listed Chinese 
firms that comprise the Halter USX CHINA index, the Russell 2000 and this study's 
entire sample of U.S. and Chinese RMs over the three year period 2008-2010. 
Chinese RMs are those conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by 
a U.S. firm and U.S. RMs are those conducted between two U.S. companies. 
Historical returns for the Russell Investments and the Halter Index websites 
were collected from their respective websites. 
2008 2009 2010 
U.S. reverse mergers 3.13 4.57 4.62 
Chinese cross-listed firms -69.36 33.46 9.56 
Russell 2000 -34.8 25.2 25.3 
Chinese reverse mergers 8.54 35.43 21.54 
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Table 3.1. 2009 growth and premium/discount summary data for 
four financial media highlighted Bond ETFs 
This table reports growth and premium/discount summary data for the four financial media 
highlighted Bond ETFs in this study: 1) US iShares iBoxx High Yield Corporate Bond Fund 
(HYG), 2) US iShares Barclays 1-3 Year Credit Bond Fund (symbol CSJ), 3) U.S. Vanguard 
Total Bond Fund ETF (symbol BND and 4) US SPDR Barclays Capital High Yield Bond ETF 
(symbol JNK). The data reflects the four funds' increases in the number and growth of 
outstanding shares as well as the highest, lowest and mean premiums. US Vanguard Total Bond 
Market ETF (symbol BND) and US SPDR Barclays Capital High Yield Bond ETF (symbol 
JNK) began trading in 2009. 
Bond ETF HYG CSJ BND JNK 
Outstanding Shares Growth During 2009 (mill) 19.1 35.4 8.3 52.8 
Outstanding Shares Percentage Growth 2009 77% 416% 488% 44 
Outstanding Shares (millions) Jan 2,2009 24.8 8.5 1.7 23.4 
Outstanding Shares (millions) Dec 31,2009 49.6 43.9 9.9 78.6 
Minimum Percentage Premium 2009 -3.2% .7% -3.1% -2.0% 
Maximum Percentage Premium 2009 12.8% 4.9% 13.5% 9.1% 
Mean Premium Percentage 2009 1.8% 2.2% 1.6% 1.5% 
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Table 3.2. 2009 descriptive statistics for four financial media highlighted 
Bond ETFs 
This table reports summary data for the four financial media highlighted Bond ETFs in this 
study: 1) US iShares iBoxx High Yield Corporate Bond Fund (HYG), 2) US iShares 
Barclays 1-3 Year Credit Bond Fund (symbol CSJ), 3) U.S. Vanguard Total Bond Fund 
ETF (symbol BND) and 4) US SPDR Barclays Capital High Yield Bond ETF (symbol 
JNK). OUTSHARES is the total number of outstanding shares, PREMIUM is the 
premium/discount, NAV is the net asset value, LAST PRICE is the closing price of the 
ETF fund and SPREAD is the dollar difference between the market price and net asset 
value (NAV). US Vanguard Total Bond Market ETF (symbol BND) and US SPDR 
Barclays Capital High Yield Bond ETF (symbol JNK) began trading in 2009. 
Panel A. US iShares iBoxx High Yield Corporate Bond Fund (HYG) 
OUTSHARES PREMIUM NAV LASTPRICE SPREAD 
Mean 40.02870 2.007696 76.66138 78.17041 0.044043 
Median 42.90000 1.812500 76.73905 78.37000 0.085000 
Maximum 49.60000 12.76100 86.00420 87.00000 3.660000 
Minimum 24.80000 -3.232000 63.60000 61.64000 -3.280000 
Std. Dev. 7.145234 1.963649 6.300968 6.192640 0.945868 
Skewness -0.497907 1.164421 -0.201747 -0.427978 -0.244426 
Kurtosis 1.724602 8.917649 1.935171 2.387225 5.242225 
Jarque-Bera 25.09190 387.5698 12.42640 10.61981 50.47110 
Probability 0.000004 0.000000 0.002003 0.004942 0.000000 
Sum 9206.600 461.7700 17632.12 17979.19 10.13000 
Sum Sq. Dev. 11691.45 883.0048 9091.802 8781.873 204.8788 
Observations 259 259 259 259 259 
Panel B. US iShares Barclays 1-3 Year Credit Bond Fund (symbol CSJ) 
OUTSHARES PREMIUM NAV LASTPRICE SPREAD 
Mean 23.68435 2.160591 100.1577 102.3103 0.016260 
Median 22.05000 2.189000 100.2186 102.9967 0.035000 
Maximum 43.90000 4.923000 103.8028 104.6667 1.439900 
Minimum 8.500000 0.690000 95.71260 97.25690 -1.090000 
Std. Dev. 10.54233 0.832061 2.365260 2.042916 0.325910 
Skewness 0.248624 0.422639 -0.164948 -0.809717 0.041362 
Kurtosis 1.785654 3.040851 1.677580 2.508568 6.161594 
Jarque-Bera 16.50146 6.863230 17.80225 27.44734 95.85747 
Probability 0.000261 0.032335 0.000136 0.000001 0.000000 
Sum 5447.400 496.9360 23036.26 23531.38 3.739900 
Sum Sq. Dev. 25451.22 158.5425 1281.130 955.7330 24.32369 
Observations 259 259 259 259 259 
Panel C. U.S. Vanguard Total Bond Fund ETF (symbol BND) 
OUTSHARES PREMIUM NAV LASTPRICE SPREAD 
Mean 57.09383 0.641740 77.38872 77.88288 0.007048 
Median 56.80000 0.628000 77.10000 77.69000 0.030000 
Maximum 76.40000 2.729000 80.13000 80.29000 1.350000 
Minimum 38.30000 -0.076000 75.38000 75.92000 -0.800000 
Std. Dev. 11.01273 0.338641 1.203346 1.070945 0.265778 
Skewness 0.019935 1.755503 0.429859 0.269769 0.182031 
Kurtosis 1.859178 10.55037 1.953154 1.968913 5.486904 
Jarque-Bera 12.32482 655.7956 17.35605 12.80886 59.75049 
Probability 0.002107 0.000000 0.000170 0.001654 0.000000 
Sum 12960.30 145.6750 17567.24 17679.41 1.600000 
Sum Sq. Dev. 27409.35 25.91713 327.2575 259.2046 15.96412 
Observations 247 247 247 247 247 
Panel D. US SPDR Barclays CapUal High Yield Bond ETF (symbol JNK) 
OUTSHARES PREMIUM NAV LAST PRICE SPREAD 
Mean 51.65608 1.676461 33.61130 34.15886 0.027174 
Median 52.00600 1.515000 34.07305 34.71700 0.062000 
Maximum 78.62400 9.132000 38.27530 38.69000 1.170000 
Minimum 23.40000 -2.464000 26.18590 25.85000 -1.580000 
Std. Dev. 17.35342 1.561353 3.384324 3.306743 0.442172 
Skewness 0.048564 1.282044 -0.331919 -0.476881 -0.782766 
Kurtosis 1.584456 6.948634 1.915286 2.217480 4.776550 
Jarque-Bera 19.29315 212.4266 15.49898 14.58584 53.73396 
Probability 0.000065 0.000000 0.000431 0.000680 0.000000 
Sum 11880.90 385.5860 7730.598 7856.537 6.250000 
Sum Sq. Dev. 68961.31 558.2614 2622.886 2504.012 44.77327 
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 
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Table 3.3. ETF average premium versus observed average range of 
underlying market bid/offer spread for identified 
Bond ETF sectors for the period 2007 - 2010 
This table reports the average basis point (bps) premium/discount and underlying market 
bid/offer spread for the identified Bond ETF sectors over the period of January 1, 2007 
through December 31, 2010. The categories include 12 short term (1 to 3 year) Treasuries, 
14 midterm Treasuries, 14 long-term (20 + years) Treasuries, 6 U.S. Treasury inflation 
protected security (TIPS) funds, 9 aggregate bond funds, 28 investment-grade (to include 
municipals) corporate funds and 4 high yield funds. 




Short Term ( 1 to 3 yr) U.S. Treasuries 1.1-3.6 
Midterm (5 to 15 yr) U.S. Treasuries 
Long Term (20 + yr) U.S. Treasuries 
Treasury Inflation Protected Securities 
(TIPS) 
Aggregate Bond Funds 
Investment Grade Corporate 














Table 3.4. Correlations 
This table reports the correlations among the Bond ETF premiums (discounts), transaction 
costs, illiquidity, flow factor, momentum and the volatility and marker sentiment indices. 
Transaction (share creation) costs are captured by the weighted average bid/offer spread 
observed in the underlying shares. Illiquidity is measured as the square root of the daily 
return divided by daily dollar volume. The flow factor is the level of supply and demand in 
the secondary market measured by the number of shares outstanding. Momentum is the 
natural log of the ratio of the fixed income ETF funds closing NAV on day t divided by the 
closing NAV on day t - 1. Near term market expectation of volatility is measured using the 





factor Momentum Volatility 
Market 
Sentiment 
Premium 0.2253 0.4286 -0.0179 0.0112 0.3187 -0.0067 
Transaction 
costs 1.0 0.5163 -0.0013 0.0436 0.2975 -0.0004 
Illiquidity - 1.0 -0.0161 -0.0547 0.3648 -0.0055 
Flow factor - - 1.0 0.0496 0.3491 0.0024 
Momentum - - - 1.0 0.3263 0.0046 
Volatility 
- - -
- 1.0 -0.0081 
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Table 3.5. Granger Causality Tests for independent variables 
and premium 
This table reports Granger Causality Test results for the six independent 
variables relationship to premium (P). Panel A reports results for transaction 
costs (COST), Panel B for illiquidity (ILM), Panel C for fund flows (FLOW), 
Panel D for momentum (MOM), Panel E for volatility (VOL) and Panel F for 
market sentiment (SENT) 
Panel A. Transaction costs (COST) 
and premium (P) 
Dependent variable: D(COST) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(P) 0.175338 2 3.8722 
Dependent variable: D(P) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(COST) 6.302451 2 0.0185 
Panel B. Illiquidity (ILM) and 
premium (P) 
Dependent variable: DflOLM) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(P) 0.108562 2 6.7833 
Dependent variable: D(P) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(ILM) 9.754812 2 0.0015 
Panel C. Fundflow (FLOW) and 
premium (P) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(P) 0.354477 2 2.7124 
Dependent variable: D(P) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(FLOW) 7.21356 2 0.0124 
Panel D. Momentum (MOM) and 
premium (P) 
Dependent variable: D(MOM) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(P) 0.106832 2 8.7367 
Dependent variable: D(P) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(MOM) 4.264901 2 0.0368 
Panel E. Volatility (VOL) and 
premium (P) 
Dependent variable: D(VOL) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(P) 0.148839 2 4.7153 
Dependent variable: D(P) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(VOL) 5.264901 2 0.0033 
Panel F. Market sentiment (SENT) 
and premium (P) 
Dependent variable: D(SENT) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(P) 0.133532 2 5.9592 
Dependent variable: D(P) 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob 
D(SENT) 7.521853 2 0.0164 
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Table 3.6. Impact of independent variables on premium 
for all Bond ETFs funds 
This table reports estimates of cross sectional regressions for the complete sample of 
Bond ETFs funds. Each panel reports regression results for different study periods as 
follows: Panel A for the period 2002 through 2006; Panel B focuses on January 1, 2007 -
December 31, 2010; Panel C analyzes the period January 1, 2007 through September 14, 
2008, a period before the fall of Lehman Brothers; Panel D reports results for the period of 
September 15, 2008 through December 31, 2010. Bond ETF premiums (discounts) are the 
dependent variable (Pu), defined as the difference in the Bond ETF price and the fund's 
NAV, divided by the NAV. Specifically, the following model is estimated: 
Pit = a + PtCOSTu + f}2ILMit + p3FL0Wit + M0Mlt + psVOLlt + P6SENTlt + sit 
The independent variables are defined as follows: transaction costs (COST) are captured by 
the weighted average bid/offer spread observed in the underlying shares, illiquidity (ILM) 
measured as the square root of the daily return divided by daily dollar volume, a flow factor 
(FLOW) measuring the level of supply and demand in the secondary market by the number 
of shares outstanding, momentum (MOM) as the natural log of the ratio of the fixed income 
ETF funds closing NAV on day t divided by the closing NAV on day t - 1, near term 
market expectation of volatility (VOL) as measured by the CBOE volatility index and 
market sentiment (SENT) measured using Baker and Wurgler's (2006) index. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The bottom rows 
of each column report adjusted R2 and the F-statistic for a null hypothesis test that the 
intercept and all slope coefficients are equal to zero. N is the number of funds in that time 
Panel A. All Bond ETF Funds 2002 - December 31,2007 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 0.0270*** 0.0277*** 0.0273*** 0.0274*** 0.0279*** 
(6.52) (6.81) (6.64) (6.72) (6.93) 
COST 0.0347*** 0.0283*** 0.0345*** 0.0319*** 0.0327*** 











Adj. R2 0.1971 0.1604 0.1756 0.1686 0.1456 
F-stat 19.77*** 18.93*** 20.03*** 20.44*** 18.37*** 
N 6 6 6 6 6 
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Panel B. All Bond ETFfunds January 1,2007 - December 31,2010 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 ModelS Model 6 
Intercept 0.0263*** 0.0266*** 0.0253*** 0.0251*** 0.0268*** 0.0259*** 
(4.38) (4.44) (4.24) (4.12) (4.57) (4.31) 
COST 0.0338*** 0.0272*** 0.0298*** 0.0311*** 0.0295*** 0.0227*** 
(5.44) (4.28) (4.66) (5.39) (4.36) (2.96) 
ILM 0.0194*** 0.0216*** 
(5.26) (4.61) 
FLOW -0.0065*** -0.0044*** 
(4.91) (3.87) 
MOM 0.0184*** 0.0118** 
(3.62) (2.17) 
VOL 0.0208*** 0.0135*** 
(5.27) (3.71) 
SENT -0.0010** -0.0008** 
(2.29) (2.14) 
Adj. R2 0.1668 0.1513 0.1835 0.1954 0.1447 0.1712 
F-stat 18.12*** 17.22*** 16.03*** 19.12*** 16.88*** 16.79*** 
N 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Panel C. All Bond ETF funds January 1, 2007 - September 14, 2008 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.0277*** 0.0286*** 0.0273*** 0.0271*** 0.0282*** 0.0263*** 
(4.65) (4.71) (4.60) (4.58) (4.68) (4.56) 
COST 0.0321*** 0.0292*** 0.0308*** 0.0319*** 0.0294*** 0.0224*** 





















Adj. R2 0.1644 0.1507 0.1812 0.1921 0.1613 0.1978 
F-stat 18.77*** 17.05*** 19.07*** 19.62*** 16.55*** 17.45*** 
N 39 39 39 39 39 39 
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Panel D. All Bond ETFs September 15,2008 - December 31,2010 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 












































F-stat 16.88*** 17.90*** 14.57*** 14.43*** 17.04*** 16.88*** 
N 68 68 68 68 68 68 
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Table 3.7. Impact of independent variables on premium for the 
U.S. Treasury Bond ETF sector 2007 - 2010 
This table reports estimates of cross sectional regressions for the Bond ETF U.S. 
Treasury fund sector from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2010 to include short 
term (1 to 3 year), midterm, long term (20+ years) and Treasury inflation protected 
(TIPS) security funds. The sector's ETF premiums (discounts) are the dependent variable 
(Pit), defined as the difference in the ETF price and the fund's NAV, divided by the NAV. 
Specifically, the following model is estimated: 
Pit = a + pxCOSTit + P2lLMit + p2FL0Wit + /?4MOMit + psV0Lit + 06SENTit + £tt 
The independent variables are defined as follows: transaction costs (COST) are captured by 
the weighted average bid/offer spread observed in the underlying shares, illiquidity (ILM) 
measured as the square root of the daily return divided by daily dollar volume, a flow factor 
(FLOW) measuring the level of supply and demand in the secondary market by the number of 
shares outstanding, momentum (MOM) is the natural log of the ratio of the fixed income ETF 
funds closing NAV on day t divided by the closing NAV on day t - 1, near term market 
expectation of volatility (VOL) as measured by the CBOE volatility index and market 
sentiment (SENT) measured using Baker and Wurgler's (2006) index. The bottom rows of 
each column report adjusted R2 and the F-statistic for a null hypothesis test that the intercept 
and all slope coefficients are equal to zero. N is the number of funds. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * represent significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.0111*** 0.0113*** 0.0106*** 0.0107*** 0.0108*** 0.0096*** 
(7.06) (7.11) (6.88) (6.92) (6.97) (4.77) 
COST 0.0153*** 0.0134*** 0.0144*** 0.0189*** 0.0173*** 0.0125*** 





















Adj. RJ 0.1396 0.1148 0.1552 0.1476 0.1410 0.1556 
F-stat 13.74*** 12.42*** 11.91*** 10.43*** 9.08*** 11.01*** 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 
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Table 3.8. Impact of independent variables on premium for the 
Aggregate Bond ETF Sector 2007-2010 
This table reports estimates of cross sectional regressions for the aggregate Bond 
ETF fund sector from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2010. The sector's 
ETF premiums (discounts) are the dependent variable (Pit), defined as the difference in 
the ETF price and the fund's NAV, divided by the NAV. Specifically, the following 
model is estimated: 
Pit = a + faCOSTu + p2ILMu + P3FLOWit + P4M0Mit + PsVOLlt + P6SENTlt + % 
The independent variables are defined as follows: transaction costs (COST) are captured 
by the weighted average bid/offer spread observed in the underlying shares, illiquidity 
(ILM) is measured as the square root of the daily return divided by daily dollar volume, a 
flow factor (FLOW) measuring the level of supply and demand in the secondary market 
by the number of shares outstanding, momentum (MOM) is the natural log of the ratio of 
the fixed income ETF funds closing NAV on day t divided by the closing NAV on day t -
I, near term market expectation of volatility (VOL) is measured by the CBOE volatility 
index and market sentiment (SENT) is measured using Baker and Wurgler's (2006) 
index. The bottom rows of each column report adjusted R2 and the F-statistic for a null 
hypothesis test that the intercept and all slope coefficients are equal to zero. N is the 
number of funds. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 




























Adj. R2 0.1954 0.1863 0.1922 0.1941 
(2.22) 
0.1773 
F-stat 12.56*** 11.84*** 12.01*** 12.43*** 13.08*** 
N 9 9 9 9 9 
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Table 3.9. Impact of independent variables on premium for the 
Investment Grade Corporate Bond ETF Sector 2007 - 2010 
This table reports estimates of cross sectional regressions for the investment grade 
corporate (to include municipals) Bond ETF fund sector from January 1, 2007 through 
December 31, 2010. The sector's ETF premiums (discounts) are the dependent variable 
{Pit), defined as the difference in the ETF price and the fund's NAV, divided by the NAV. 
Specifically, the following model is estimated for the period January 1,2007 - December 31, 
2010: 
Pit=a + PiC0STit + p2ILMit + f}3FLOWit + ^ MOMit + psVOLit + fi6SENTit + eit 
The independent variables are defined as follows: transaction costs (COST) captured by the 
weighted average bid/offer spread observed in the underlying shares, illiquidity (ILM) 
measured as the square root of the daily return divided by daily dollar volume, a flow factor 
(FLOW) measuring the level of supply and demand in the secondary market by the number 
of shares outstanding, momentum (MOM) as the natural log of the ratio of the fixed income 
ETF funds closing NAV on day t divided by the closing NAV on day t -1, near term market 
expectation of volatility (VOL) as measured by the CBOE volatility index and market 
sentiment (SENT) measured using Baker and Wurgler's (2006) index. The bottom rows of 
each column report adjusted R2 and the F-statistic for a null hypothesis test that the intercept 
and all slope coefficients are equal to zero. N is the number of funds. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.0242*** 0.0243*** 0.0241*** 0.0240*** 0.0244*** 0.0239*** 
(6.69) (6.73) (6.62) (6.58) (6.77) (4.66) 
COST 0.0336*** 0.0342*** 0.0314*** 0.0328*** 0.0348*** 0.0267*** 





















Adj. R2 0.1873 0.1716 0.1944 0.1963 0.1688 0.1677 
F-stat 14.94*** 14.04*** 13.57*** 15.71*** 11.69*** 13.76*** 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 
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Figure 2.1. Number of Chinese reverse mergers by year 2004 - 2010 
This fiqure plots the total of442 Chinese RMs by year that were consumated between 
January 1, 2004 and December 31,2010 compiled from PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s data base. 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
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Figure 2.2. All Reverse Mergers in the U. S. markets by 
target country 2008 - 2010 
This figure plots the number of reverse mergers consummated from January 1, 2008 
through December 31, 2010 by quarter compiled from PrivateRaise/D. F, M.'s data base. 
The U.S. RM line plots the number of reverse mergers that took place between two U.S. 
participants. The China RM line plots the number of reverse mergers where a Chinese 
company was the target company. Foreign (non-China) transactions are those where a non-










US RMs -Hi • Chinese RMs — Foreign RMs (non China) 
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Figure 2.3. Reverse merger [-30 day, +30 dayJ returns comparison 
of Chinese and U.S. RMs 
This chart plots the average buy and hold returns for the 30 days prior to the RM 
consummation to 30 days afterward for the 183 Chinese RMs and 425 U.S. RMs that 
traded stock and took place between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2010. Chinese 
RMs are those conducted between a Chinese firm being acquired by a U.S. firm and U.S. 
RMs are those conducted between two U.S. companies. The data was compiled from 
PrivateRaise/D. F. M.'s database as well as Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. 
40 
Chinese —US 
Figure 3.1. Total number of fixed income ETFs by year 2002 - 2010 
This figure plots the total number of fixed income ETFs that existed in the U.S. 
markets in each calendar year from 2002 through 2010. The data was collected from 
the Wall Street Journal April 11, 2011. 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
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Figure 3.2. Totalfixed income ETF investment 2002 - 2010 
This figure plots the total investment in fixed income (bond) ETFs (in billions) for each 
calendar year from January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2010. The data was collected 









2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
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Figure 3.3. Total investments in fixed income securities by category 
2000-2010 
This chart plots the investments (in billions) in domestic government bonds, investment 
grade U.S. corporate bonds and higher risk bonds, comparing the total investments in 
each category for the nine year period of 2000 - 2008 to the two year period 2009-
2010. The domestic government bonds category includes U.S. Treasuries, mortgage 
backed securities and municipal bonds. The higher risk bond category includes foreign 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 3.1. U.S. listed BOND (fixed income) ETF's as of December 31,2010 
ABFXF:US ABF Pan Asia Bond Index Fund 
CLFMF:US Claymore 1-5 Year Laddered Government Bond ETF 
XUBDX:US Claymore/Dorchester - The Capital Markets Bond Index ETF 
UBD:US Claymore/Dorchester - The Capital Markets Bond Index ETF 
XULQX:US Claymore/Dorchester Micro-Term Fixed Income ETF 
ULQ:US Claymore/Dorchester Micro-Term Fixed Income ETF 
UEM:US Claymore/Dorchester US 1 - The Capital Markets Index ETF 
XUEMXrUS Claymore/Dorchester US 1 - The Capital Markets Index ETF 
TYO:US Direxion Daily 10 Year Treasury Bear 3X 
TYD:US Direxion Daily 10 Year Treasury Bull 3X 
TMV:US Direxion Daily 30 Year Treasury Bear 3X 
TMF:US Direxion Daily 30 Year Treasury Bull 3X 
SMB:US Market Vectors - Barclays AMT-Free Short Municipal ETF 
ITM:US Market Vectors Lehman Brothers AMT-Free Intermediate Municipal ETF 
MLN:US Market Vectors Lehman Brothers AMT-Free Long Municipal Index ETF 
HYD:US Market Vectors High Yield Municipal Index ETF 
PRB:US Market Vectors Pre-Refunded Municipal Index ETF 
TUZ:US PIMCO 1-3 Year U.S. Treasury Index Fund 
STPZ:US PIMCO 1-5 Year US TIPS Index Fund 
LTPZ-.US PIMCO 15+Year US TIPS Index Fund 
ZROZ:US PIMCO 25+ Year Zero Coupon US Treasury Index Fund 
FIVZ:US PIMCO 3-7 Year US Treasury Index Fund 
TENZ:US PIMCO 7-15 Year US Treasury Index Fund 
TIPZ:US PIMCO Broad US TIPS Index Fund 
MINT:US PIMCO Enhanced Short Maturity Strategy Fund 
MUNI:US PIMCO Intermediate Municipal Bond Strategy Fund 
PLW:US PowerShares 1-30 Laddered Treasury Portfolio 
PLK:US PowerShares Active Low Duration Portfolio 
BAB:US PowerShares Build America Bond Portfolio 
PCY:US PowerShares Emerging Markets Sovereign Debt Portfolio 
PHB:US PowerShares High Yield Corporate Bond Portfolio 
PWZ:US PowerShares Insured California Municipal Bond Portfolio 
PZA:US PowerShares Insured National Municipal Bond Portfolio 
PZT:US PowerShares Insured New York Municipal Bond Portfolio 
PVI:US PowerShares VRDO Tax Free Weekly Portfolio 
TBF:US ProShares Short 20+ Year Treasury 
TBT:US ProShares Ultrashort 20+ Year Treasury 
PST:US ProShares Ultrashort Lehman 7-10 Year Treasury 
BIL:US SPDR Barclays Capital 1-3 Month T-Bill ETF 
LAG:US SPDR Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond ETF 
CXA:US SPDR Barclays Capital California Municipal Bond ETF 
CWB:US SPDR Barclays Capital Convertible Bond ETF 
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JNK:US SPDR Barclays Capital High Yield Bond ETF 
ITR:US SPDR Barclays Capital Intermediate Term Credit Bond ETF 
ITE:US SPDR Barclays Capital Intermediate Term Treasury ETF 
BWX:US SPDR Barclays Capital International Treasury Bond ETF 
LWC:US SPDR Barclays Capital Long Term Credit Bond ETF 
TLO:US SPDR Barclays Capital Long Term Treasury ETF 
MBG:US SPDR Barclays Capital Mortgage Backed Bond ETF 
TFI:US SPDR Barclays Capital Municipal Bond ETF 
INY:US SPDR Barclays Capital New York Municipal Bond ETF 
BWZ:US SPDR Barclays Capital Short Term International Treasury Bond ETF 
SHM:US SPDR Barclays Capital Short Term Municipal Bond ETF 
IPE:US SPDR Barclays Capital TIPS ETF 
WIP:US SPDR DB International Government Inflation-Protected Bond ETF 
VRD:US SPDR S&P VRDO Municipal Bond ETF 
EDV:US Vanguard Extended Duration Treasury ETF 
BIV:US Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond ETF 
VCIT:US Vanguard Intermediate-Term Corporate Bond ETF 
VGIT:US Vanguard Intermediate-Term Government Bond ETF 
BLV:US Vanguard Long-Term Bond ETF 
VCLT:US Vanguard Long-Term Corporate Bond ETF 
VGLT:US Vanguard Long-Term Government Bond ETF 
VMBS:US Vanguard Mortgage-Backed Securities ETF 
BSV:US Vanguard Short-Term Bond ETF 
VCSH:US Vanguard Short-Term Corporate Bond ETF 
VGSH:US Vanguard Short-Term Government Bond ETF 
BND:US Vanguard Total Bond Market ETF 
USY:US WisdomTree US Short Term Government Income Fund 
ISRPF:US iShares - iShares $ Corporate Bond 
CSJ:US iShares Barclays 1-3 Year Credit Bond Fund 
SHY:US iShares Barclays 1-3 Year Treasury Bond Fund 
TLH:US iShares Barclays 10-20 Year Treasury Bond Fund 
TLT:US iShares Barclays 20+ Year Treasury Bond Fund 
IEI:US iShares Barclays 3-7 Year Treasury Bond Fund 
IEF:US iShares Barclays 7-10 Year Treasury Bond Fund 
AGZ:US iShares Barclays Agency Bond Fund 
AGG:US iShares Barclays Aggregate Bond Fund 
CFT:US iShares Barclays Credit Bond Fund 
GBF:US iShares Barclays Government/Credit Bond Fund 
CIU:US iShares Barclays Intermediate Credit Bond Fund 
GVI:US iShares Barclays Intermediate Government/Credit Bond Fund 
MBB:US iShares Barclays MBS Bond Fund 
SHV:US iShares Barclays Short Treasury Bond Fund 
TIP:US iShares Barclays TIPS Bond Fund 
ISDXF:US iShares CDN DEX All Corporate Bond Index Fund 











CDN DEX Short Term Bond Index Fund 
JPMorgan USD Emerging Markets Bond Fund 
S&P AMT-Free Municipal Bond Fund 
S&P California AMT-Free Municipal Bond Fund 
S&P National Municipal Bond Fund 
S&P Short Term National AMT-Free Municipal Bond Fund 
S&P/Citigroup 1-3 Year International Treasury Bond Fund 
S&P/Citigroup International Treasury Bond Fund 
iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond Fund 
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